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PREFACE
During "the last two decades there has been an increase
of military interventions within, and military rule over,
states in the third world. There was a rush of military
interventions in 1958—Pakistan, Iraq, Burma, etc.
S^^^^^nients today control about half the developing
states. The forcefulness with which military officers
justify their coups in terms of eliminating the chaos, in-
©fficiency
,
and corruption of their civilian predecessors,
and the need to get on with the modernization of society,
might suggest that the military were a progressive force.
They offer to regenerate the society in short order and to
reconstruct the polity along more just lines. Do they
succeed?. Do they bring about national unity, progress,
and modernity? Do they pursue policies of socio-economic
change and reform? Or do they inhibit social and economic
development? These are only some of the questions that
are of obvious interest because of the number of military
governments in the developing states.
In this thesis, we shall focus on the military regime
which existed in Pakistan and examine the actual workings
of its policies and institutions. We do so because the
Xmilitary regime in Pakistan provides a very adequate
example of military government, and also meets the
selected criteria necessary in studying military govern-
ments .
A military regime is an appropriate case study if it
has been in power for considerable time. Also it should
have run its course. This does not mean that the regime
must have fallen before it can be studied, but that some-
thing of a landmark must have passed that clearly
distinguishes the period before from that after. The
military regime in Pakistan existed for a decade which is
an adequate enough time in which to observe its
accomplishments and liabilities.
Various data sources, covering the years 1958-1971
»
have been employed. They include primarily newspapers,
government and research publications. The data obtained
from these sources is subjected to an interpretative
analysis. We shall attempt to question certain views
about the military as a nation-building, modernizing, and
stabilizing agent. We shall examine the nation-building
activities of the military and its role in the politics
of Pakistan during 1958-1971- Perhaps we can learn the
major limitations of military regimes and the factors
which limit their political capacity by studying an
©xainple
, i.e.i Pakistani Tha failurs of modernization
and political development has been evidenced in many
developing states that have civilian regimes. Our
concern v/ould be to show that the militaries are subject
to failures too, and that their failures can be traced to
specific consequences of military coup and rule.
CHAPTER I
THE MILITARY AND THE NEW NATIONS
One characteristic of Asian politics over the last
twenty years
» has been the influence of the military on
the course of political change. The military has either
actually assumed political power or is playing a political
role in collaboration with political elite. Out of
twenty independent states of Asia there have been
successful coups in Pakistan, Thailand, Burma, South Korea,
South Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia, Cambod:a and insurgencies
and uprisings in most of the remaining Asian countries.
A look at the African map shows a similar picture of an
increasing number of military take-overs. Algeria,
Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Togo, Uganda,
Nigeria, Dahomey, have witnessed successful coups. The
military has also been playing a vital political role in
a number of Middle Eastern countries, as evidenced by
coups in Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yeman and the Sudan.
In Latin America few countries have escaped military
rule. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru are
2are amongst those Latin American countries which have
coups and. counter—coups at one time or another.
According to S. Finer, as of December 31, I 974 the
countries governed hy men who came to power as a result of
military intervention numbered thirty-eight. This rep-
resented twenty-five percent of the world's one-hundred and
fifty independent states and comprised some fifty-five per-
cent of the population of Latin America, nearly two-thirds
of the population of the Arab states of North-Africa and the
Middle East, and a like proportion of the population of sub-
1
Saharan Africa.
Despite diversity in the impact of .riilitary inter-
vention in politics, most political scientists agree that
there is a great similarity in the political culture and
socio-economic conditions of the states witnessing the rise
of the military to political power. These states are
popularly known the developing nations or the under-
developed nations or the new nations.
The very terms "new nations" and "underdeveloped" or
"developings areas" reflect an assumption that similar
political, economic, and social problems and goals charac-
terize a host of states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
For a detailed chronological checklist of military inter-
ventions 1958 -1974 , see Samuel Finer, The Man On Horseback -
The Role of The Military in Politics , Harmondsworth-Middle-
sex: Penguin Books, 1975 » (paperback edition) pp. 269-273-
3These are socities with low levels of economic productivity
and high degrees of social cleavage. These nations are
marked by horizontal and vertical cleavages in their social
structure. On the horizontal level, linguistic, ethnic and
regional diversities create problems in the political system.
On the vertical level, there is a wide gap between the
Westernized elites and the illiterate masses, between the
rich and the poor.^
The lack of unity in the new nations manifests itself in
a number of ways. Certain sections of the population refuse
to submit to the authority of the central government or they
demand special safeguards to protect their rights. There is
also a demand for maximum autonomy or independence. These
"tat ions reflect mutual distrust and lack of national
identity which raises its head once nationalist sentiments
developed in the last phase of the independence movement
start disappearing. The basic objective of the leaders of
the new nations is not to convert these diversities into a
uniformity but a congruence of diversities leading to a
unity in which both varieties and similarities are main-
tained.
2For a discussion of gaps, see Edward Shils
,
"The Military
in The Political Development of New States," in John J.
J. Johnson, ed.
,
The Role of The Military in Underdeveloped
Countries
, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1962, pp. 14-33.
4Th6 lack of unify challenges "the hold of fhe governmenf
over certain areas. On occasions the government has to
resort to force to keep the fabric of the state intact.
Such actions do not always produce the desired results.
Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, India and numerous other
nations have been seriously threatened by ethnic, regional
and linguistic challenges. Pakistan's experiment in nation-
building, unique in the history of the new nations, failed
in 1971 when East Pakistan broke away and transformed it-
self into Bangladesh.
The State of The Literature
The increase of military interventions within and '
military rule over states in the third world has led to
an increase in scholarly works on the military in politics.
There have been a number of essays on the military in new
states and s'" '"3 in detail and depth of the military
in a particular country. Most of the latter have been
4published as essays on the military of a geographic area.
There have also been selections devoted to the military
5in anthologies dealing with modernization or development
3Among the works which have taken a broad look at mili-
taries in new nations and developing areas are
;
William Gutteridge, Armed Forces in The New States
,(London; Oxford University Press i 1962 ) ; Morris Janowitz,
The Military in The Political Development of New Nations
,(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Edward Shils
,
"The Military in The Political Development of The New
States*" in John J. Johnson, ed.
,
The Role of The Military
in Underdeveloped Countries
, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1962); Lucian Pye, "Armies in The Process
of Political Modernization," Ibid
. ; Samuel Finer, The Man
On Horseback
,
(New York: Praeger, 1962); Jacques van
Doom, Armed Forces and Society
, ( The Hague: Mouton, I968 );
Wilson C\ McWilliams (ed.,) Garrisons and Government -
Politics and The Military in New States
, (San Francisco
:
Chandler Publishing Company, 196?) ; Henry Bienen, ed.
,
The Military Intervenes
,
(New York: Russell Sage, 1968 )
and The Military and Modernization
.
(Chicago; Aldine, 1971)
; Robert E. Dowse, "The Military and Political Development,"
in Politics and Change in Developing Countries
,
Colin Leys,
ed .
~i (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I969 ) ; C laude
E. Welch and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule
,
(Massachusetts: Duxbury Press ,~197^) ; Amos Perlmutter,
The Military and Politics in Modern Times
,
(New Haven;
Yale University Press, 1977.)
4Among the country studies of the military are: P.J.
Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics
,
(Bloomington:
University of Indiana Press, 1961); Edwin Lieuwen, Arms
and Politics in Latin America
,
(New York: Praeger, I96 I )
;
J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics; The Military Dimension ,
New York; Praeger, 1969); Ellis Joffe, Party and Army ;
Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese
Officer Corps , 1949-1964 , Harvard East Asian Monographs
,
No . 19 (Cambridge , Mass . : Harvard University Press, I 967 );
J. M. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order , (London :
Chatto and Windus , 1969); Alfred Stepan, The Military in
Politics; Changing Patterns in Brazil , (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1971); Phillippe Schmitter,
6in new nations. Also collections of essays on the military
in non—western areas have flowered.'^
While the literature on civil-military relations is
voluminous, most of the writings on military regimes do not
emphasize military rule as government. Although much of the
literature on the military is devoted to analyses of the
preconditions and situations of military coups and take-
overs, there has been little effort to relate the conditions
of intervention to the subsequent performance of military
regimes
.
Military Rule in Latin America, (Beverly Hills; Sage
Publications, 1973); Alan Wells, "The Coup d'etat in
Theory and Practice: Independent Black Africa in the 1960's"
American Journal of Sociology
. 79 ; 87I-887, U974).
See for example: Jacques van Doom, ed.
,
Military
Professions and Military Regimes
.
(The Hague; Mouton,
1970 ) ; Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization
and Political Power
,
(Beverly Hills; Sage Publications,
1972) ; A.R. Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of Civil-
Military Relations, " Government and Opposition 6 (Winter):
5-35» ^ (1971 ) ; Samuel Huntington, Political Order in
Changing Societies
,
(New Haven; Yale University Press,
1968); Morris Janowitz and Jacques van Doom, eds.. On
Military Intervention
,
(Rotterdom: Rotterdam University
Press , 1971 )
;
Edward Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats
, (Boston:
Houghton-Mifflin, 1973); Catherine Kelleher, Political -
Military Systems; Comparative Perspectives
,
(Beverly Hills;
Sage Publications, 197^); Kenneth Fidel, Militarism in
Developing Countries, (New Brunswick: Transaction Inc.,
1975).
7Increasingly, attention has been shifting to analysis
of the consequences of military intervention in the develop-
ment process • Observers now try to evaluate the performance
of the military as a ruling group; the militaries' capacity
for maintaining stability, creating political institutions
and achieving economic development and national integration
are being studied. The role of the military as a moderni-
zing force in society is now being examined. Some of this
literature criticizes past approaches and some of it, on the
other hand, confirms or even elaborates upon them, and some
of it is raising issues to which little attention has been
devoted at all.
The use of aggregate data and statistical analysis, for
instance has been abundant. There is a growing case study,
theoretical, and data-based literature dealing with military
regimes and the consequences of military rule.^
Typical examples are; Eric Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti:
The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change
In the Non-Westem States," American Political Science
Review
,
64 (December) ;1131-1148, (1970); Richard Li, ^The
Coup Contagion Hypothesis," Journal of Conflict Resolution ,
19 (March); 63-68, (1975); R- Neal Tannahill, "Military
Intervention In Search of A Dependent Variable," Journal of
Political and Military Sociology , 3 (Fall); 219-228 , (1975)
;
Lee Sigelman, "Military Intervention; A Methodological Note,"
Journal of Political and Military Sociology. 2 (Fall);
275-281, (1974).
8RGCGn't studiGs also dGal wilh civic
-Tnilitiary rclaiions,
organizations and/or structures including bureaucratic
aspects, and primary group relations (military roles,
effectiveness, etc.) Studies of social origins and demo-
graphic character of armies and the officer corps as a
profession have also been important.'^
The middle class and modernization theses were put
forth by students of development and stratification in the
early 1960's as reasons for military intervention. Also
a number of social scientists eulogized and exalted the
modernizing ability of the military in the non-western
nations, but by the early 19?0's this vi^w has lost its
7See Joseph Strauss, "Historical Trends of Military Socio-
logy," Paper presented at the Pacific Sociological Associa-
tion meetings in April 8-10, 1971; Alan R. Millett, "Arms
Control and Research on Military Institutions," Armed
Forces and Society
,
l(November): 61-78, (197^); George A.
Kourvetaris and Betty A. Dobratz, Social Origins and
Political Orientations of Officers Corps in a World
Perspective
, M^.i..c>raph Series in World Affairs, Vol 10,
Monograph No. 4/1972-73* Denver; University of Denver Press.
o
^See Lucian Pye
,
"Armies in the Process of Political
Modernization," in John J. Johnson, ed.
,
The Role of The
Military in Underdeveloped Countries , op. cit .
;
Lieuwen,
Arms and Politics in Latin America , op. cit .
;
Edward
Shils
,
"The Military in The Political Development of the
New States," in John J. Johnson, op. cit .
9appeal. More recently these theses have been criticized by
many students of civil-military relations^ who contend that
there is no empirical evidence to substantiate the claim
that the military more than the civilian elites are the
carriers of middle class aspirations and modernization in
their respective societies.
Most studies on military intervention examine the
active role of the military in national politics and probe
into its causes or consequences. Intervention of the
military into politics is a multi-dimensional, persistent,
and recurrent phenomenon. Many of the efforts to explain
the underlying causes that predispose the military to take
over the government have been inadequate. Most analysts
ignore or are unable to penetrate into the covert ways and
processes in which military managers lean to become coup-
makers, rationalizers and usurpers of legal authority.
g
•^See for example; Charles C. Moskos and Wendell Bell,
"Emerging Nations and Ideologies of American Social
Scientists," The American Sociologist , 2 (May): 67-72,
( 1967 ); Irving L. Horowitz, "The Military Elites," in
Lipset and Solari (eds.) Elites in Latin America , (New
York; Oxford University Press, 19^7); Henry Bienen, The
Military and Modernization , (Chicago; Aldine , 1971 )»
Gabriel Ben-Dor, " The Politics of Threat; Military
Intervention in the Middle East," Journal of Political
and Military Sociology , 1 (Spring): 57 -^9 * (1973)
•
10
On© of "the major debates about the consequences of
intervention concerns the ability of the military regimes
to serve as effective agents and brokers of social change
and modernization in their respective societies. Regarding
the latter, two general but opposing views have been offered,
one which sees the military as an energizing and moderni-
zing force and the other which stresses the inability and
limitations of the military in creating a viable political
institution for economic and social development.
This indicates that the political role of the military
in the developing areas is not adequately analyzed by the
simple characterizations currently employed in many
scholarly studies as well as in popular works. Too often,
military intervention in the politics of these nations is
dismissed as "military dictatorship" or rule by the
"military strongman" without full inquiry into the nature
and dynamics o-^ +’ ' political systems within which these
phenomena appear.
One scholar stresses that if we can show that the
military intervenes in a specific situation because it
feels its own professional values are threatened and its
corporate identity is at state, then we may be some
distance toward explaining its subsequent actions as a
ruling group. Similarly, if it can be shown that the
11
military, or an element of it, makes a coup because it has
a specific program for modernizing society that it feels
only it can carry out, then one may be able to more fully
10
understand military performance as a governing elite.
We are now at the point where important theoretical
arguments against the position that the military is either
an ideal or relatively good ruling organization to bring
modernization to developing areas are being heard. And a
number of case studies of military regime performance are
casting doubt on some of the statements of the early
1960's. There has not yet emerged any clear synthesis of
positions or arguments that have been dc^Anant, and at no
time has consensus been complete. When the reasons for
,
military interventions are understood and the links between
the military and other political institutions and social
groups have been explored, one can better assess the
prospects for the future evolution of the armed forces in
society and can better judge their capacities to deal with
specific problems.
10 . .
See Henry Bienen, The Military
(New York: Russell Sage, 1971)
»
and Modernization
p . 28
.
I
12
Definition of Basic Concepts
Before we proceed any further, a clarification of
basic concepts used in this study becomes necessary.
— y ^^Is or Military regime
. A country is under
military rule when officers have seized power and made them
selves politically supreme. Such power may be overt, in
which case the generals or colonels make themselves the
ol*ficial rulers, or it may be covert, where real dominance
by officers is masked by civilian puppets.
The regime in Pakistan was a mixed civil-military admi
nistration. It is regarded as a military regime for it
came to power through a military coup and the military
remained the main supporting base of the regime. Two
phases can be discerned in Pakistan's military period. The
takeover by General Ayub Khan in 1958 represents the first
phase. During 1958-1982 the regime was visibly military
while after 1982 the military generally remained in the
background. The second military takeover by General Yahya
Khan in 1989 represents the second phase. The whole period
will be analyzed because the regime's top leadership and
overall performance remained unchanged.
11Edward Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats, (Boston: Houghton-
Mifflin, 1973») P- 5-
13
political power . Is defined as the over-
coming of resistance in the making of decisions that have
(or may have) consequences for the military establishment.
Military political power is a multiplicative function of
(a) resources, and (b) their mobilization. Resources are of
two kinds, (1) structural and, (2) quantitative. The former
having to do with the location of the military in relation to
executive, legislative, and judicial positions in the state
(the existence of paramilitary forces and the relationship
between them and the military; and the relative unity or
disunity of the military establishment); the latter with
e.g.
,
the amount of men, material, and economic investments
with the military sector. The proportion of the gross
national product spent on the maintenance of the military;
the military participation ratio; and the proportion of
industrial production devoted to the manfucturing of
military goods “.bilization here has to do with the
13
multiplicative function of values, objectives and expectancy.
^^See Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and
Political Power , (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972,)
p^ l40. Abrahamsson formulates his definition of
military political power from Blalock's Toward a Theory
of Minority-Group Relations , (New York: Wiley , 19o7 , ) p . 110
Political development here refers to several
dimensions of political performance, not just a single
political role but multiple onesi We shall be concerned
with major types of political roles and aspects of political
behavior as the promotion of national unity and cohesion,
consolidation of power, the building of formal political
institutions and organizations, i.e., local government and
village participation, political parties, and constitutions.
We shall also direct our attention toward communication,
representation, negotiation of interests and demands, the
building of mass support for a regime with its goals and
its policies.
Modernization here refers to a number of distinct
and related processess of social and economic change:
industrialization, urbanization, literacy, broadening of
political participation, and increase in mass media
circulation. Economic change here implies dimensions as the
rise in per-capita income, increased production, increasing
rates of productivity, broader distribution of national
income, and so forth.
Effectiveness -- "The actual performance of a
political system, the extent to which it satisfies the
basic functions of government as defined by the expectations
of most members of a society..." We shall limit the
15
definition to the actual working of the military regime's
polici.6s and. ins'fci'tu'tions
.
Variables Explaining the Coup d'etat
The focus of much research on the military in develop-
ing nations has been the military coup d'etat. The
responsibility for this has been attributed to many inter-
related factors and variables.
One is a set of variables relating to the susceptibi-
lity of the political system to the forcible seizure of
power. Included are variables which refer to the general
pattern of legitimacy within the society attaching to
existing institutions of government and defining the
appropriate means by which authority within the system may
be transferred. Samuel Finer 's summary of the political
regimes vulnerable to military coups is typical. He
suggests a classification of the countries according to the
i
.
maturity of their political culture. He discusses countries
of developed," "low," and "minimal" political culture.
Other studies have emphasized variables which refer
13Seymour Lipset, " Some Social Requisites of Democracy,"
in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard Brown eds.. Comparative
Politics
, (Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1972,) p. 129
14 .
Finer, The Man on Horseback, op. cit ., Chapters 7, 8, & 9.
16
to broad and fundamental transformations of the system
producing instability and thereby placing a greater premium
on the use of force in politics.
Or variables related to susceptibility of the system
to forcible seizure of power may refer to specific phenomena
more limited in scope or time, such as the emergency of an
external threat to the system, or an event which discredits
a civilian regime, or removes from the scene key elements.
For example, in Pakistan, the death of the revered Mohammed
Ali Jinnah in 1948, followed by the death of his protege,
Liaquat Ali Khan, in 1951 i were events which deprived the
civilian government of their key leaders; these losses
contributed to growing discontent and instability which
were some of the factors which culminated in the military
coup of 1958*
A second set of variables is that relating to the
capacity of the military to execute a coup d'etat. The
development of military establishments with modem skill,
equipment, and weapons is a characteristic of the transi-
tional societies of Asia. Such skills, equipment, and
weapons --along with size--comprise what Lovell and Kim terms
1 6
"political resources." Coupled with other resources
i4
"^John P. Lovell and C.I. Eugene Kim, "The Military and
Political Change in Asia," in Henry Bienen, ed.
,
The
Military and Modernization
,
(New York; Aldine, 1971») p.l06
^^Ibid
.
,
p. 10?
18
prevalent among military establishments of contemporary
Asia, such as relatively disciplined, cohesive organiza-
tion, their political resources have given the military a
capacity for forcible intervention in politics.
1 Case studies show that a unified military can take
power with relative ease in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America. The military is thus a "heavy institution" in
underdeveloped countries
, and can act with authority
because it is first and foremost an institution of force
with organizational features that give it the capacity to
be effective in intervening against a civilian regime.
Furthermore the military, is often, but not always, the
most modern institution in terms of its advanced technology,
educated elite, absorption of rational norms, and exposure
1 8to western influence.
The military has then, become a critical institution
and power bloc. In many new nations coups succeed because
the public is relatively narrow and weakly organized, and
public attachment to their political institutions is so
fragile that they hardly question the legitimacy of take-
over.
17Henry Bienen, The Military and Modernization
,
op. cit
. ,
p. 10 .
1
8
See Fred Greene, "Toward Understanding Military Coups,"
African Report
,
Vol. 2,‘ Feb. I 966
, pp. 10-14.
19 “ —
.
Samuel Finer, op. cit
.
,
p. 118.
19
Political Perspectives of The Military
Undoubtedly, the coup d'etat is the most dramatic form
of participation by the military in politics. Yet seizure
of the reins of government is by no means the only, or the
most important, way in which military men and military
groups influence politics. Perhaps more important are the
roles which military groups play in the functions of
political recruitment, political socialization,
.political
communication, and the articulation and aggregations of
political interests and demands.
During the 1960's emphasis was placed on the virtues of
the military in non-western countries, Morris Janowitz
argued that is is easier for the military to accumulate
power than to govern as a ruling group. He argued that
while the militaries of new nations are more politicized
than their western counterparts and may produce a cadre of
political activists, the military does not have the
appropriate political ideologies for rule. Janowitz main-
tained that pressure toward political involvement did not
necessarily imply the development of skills appropriate
20See Morris Janowitz, "Organizing Multiple Goals: War
Making and Arms Control," in Morris Janowitz, ed.
,
The
New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization
,
(New
York: Norton, 1964,) p. 29^!
20
for ruling. It is difficult to disagree with Janowitz's
contentions
.
According to Von der Mehden, these military groups
i
inculcated with the values of order, efficiency, and dis-
cipline, wish to see these values applied to political life.
Where the army has been in the vanguard for the struggle for
independence, as in some parts of Asia, it may enter the
political arena because of a belief that the ideas of the
independence movement have been betrayed by self-seeking and
corrupt civilian politicians whose factional quarrels have
led to confusion and turmoil. Where reform, rather than
independence, is the issue, the military often claims that
it is only under conditions of stable government
--such as the
military can provide--that the desired level of economic
and social advance may be achieved.
Nevertheless, Lovell and Kim assert that there is not
a direct link between the political behavior of the military
and their political capability. Rather, in order to explain
their political behavior one must examine also their
22political attitudes and beliefs. Salient among these
21 i iFred R. Von der Mehden, The Politics of The Developing
Nations
,
(New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, 1969») p. 93*
Lovell and Kim, op, cit
.
,
p. 106.
21
beliefs are the images which they develop of their own
appropriate role and status within the society, and their
perceptions of civilian elites and of the political system
as a whole.
J
While there has been a trend toward "civilianizing"
the military profession, the difference between military
management and the skills of political leadership is still
marked. Political leaders are men who specialize in
verbal skills and in mass appeals. Military officers have
limited contact with the outside public, and it is difficult
to transfer military skills to a civilian political career.
The argument is that specific military characteristics
give the military establishment potential to assume
political power but limit its ability to exercise such
power.
In summary, the military of the new nations are more
politicized tha-n their western counterparts, and they may
even produce a cadre of political activists. The process
of education, recruitment, and the attendant emergence of
professional cohesion all work to support this politici-
zation of the military. Life career and indoctrination
lead military personnel to a broad identification with
national interest, but the military do not have
22
appropriate political ideologies. Janowitz contends that;
While they are strongly nationalistic and
orientated to collective and governmental enter-prise, military officers are skeptical and evenhostile to organized politics. They must learnthe meaning of politics hy actual experience.
What is lacking in new nations is a basis of
mutual trust between politicians and the militarv^^
profession.
23See Morris Janowitz, " The Military in The Political
Development of New Nations," in Wilson C. McWilliams,
» Garrisons and Government-Politics and The Military
in the New States, (SanFranscisco ; Dhanri~lor Puhli^hinp-
^ Co.
,
1967, ) p. 78.
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Negative Qualities of The
3-S an Agent of Modernization
To understand the reasons for the military's success
or failure, one must try to locate and analyze its main
advantages and disadvantages as an agent engineering
change and or modernization.
The scope of either success or failure to serve as an
agent of modernization is primarily a function of the
scope of the problems being faced by the political center.
In this respect, there is no difference between military
or civilian elites. Other things being equal, the military
has some advantages and disadvantages.
By deducing from attributes assumed to be inherent in
military organization, theorists have argued that military
men have a greater predisposition to a modernizing outlook
than members of other elites.
Many of the arguments about the organization and
efficiency of the military are related to the assumption
that members of the military are recruited from a comp-
aratively modern, rational, and cohesive middle class.
24See Bienen, op . cit
.
,
p. 11.
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corps, it is stated, are generally recruited from
bright and ambitious men from small towns and the country-
side and from the middle and lower-middle class. Therefore
they are inferred to be anti-aristocratic and opposed to
special privilege, progressive-minded, and open to change
and innovation.
Generalizations about the social background of mili-
tary officers are hazardous, since these can vary from
country to country and within a country over a period of
time. Statements such as the above may be based upon
inadequate knowledge of class stratification in transitional
societies. They are not correct for Pakistan for the
majority, of officers have been recruited from the upper
,
strata of this society.
As Ann Willner points out, "even where officers may be
predominantly from other than traditional elites, they may
be less interes'^^'^ in effecting' change and in reforming
the existing class structure than in ensconing themselves
2 6in the existing elite." She further stresses, that it
^^See Janowitz (1964,) op. cit .
,
p. 28; Lucian Pye (1962,)
op. cit .
,
p. 83; Edward Shils (1962,) op. cit .
,
p. 1?.
Ann Willner, "Perspectives on Military Elites as Rulers
and Wielders of Power," Journal of Comparative Adminis -
tration, Vol. 2, No. 3» November 1970, p. 2?1. For a
sumarry of arguments against the validity of predictions
of political behavior of the military on the basis of
social background, see Bengt Abrahamsson, op. cit.
,
pp.
57 -58 .
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can be argued and probably demonstrated for a number of
countries that military establishments import, adapt, and
utilize technological innovations more quickly than other
indigenously controlled organizations, but, the possession
and operation of jet planes and radar equipment do not
necessarily lead to the substitution of power looms for
handlooms and mechanized farming for the hoe and bullock-
drawn plough
.
Huntington argues that "modernization is not the
product of any one particular group, however modernized
that group may he in comparison with the rest of society.
Rather it is the product of coup and countercoup in which
military elements play important roles inaugurating both
conservative and radical regimes. His argument does not
depend on the military being a comparatively modern
organization in society. He states "that the Latin
American experience suggests that the militaries are
neither harbingers of modernization nor the defenders of
entrenched oligarchies."^^
27Winner, op. cit
.
, p. 2?2. For additional analysis of
^ome of the arguments presented here in favor of or
against the military as an agent of modernization, see
Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and The Praetorian
Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in
Developing Polities." Comparative Politics
, 1 (April):
382-4o4, ( 1969)
;
^Moshe Lissak, Military Roles in Modern -
ization: Civil-Military Relations in Tailand and Burma
,
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976,) pp. 29-33.
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From the foregoing analysis, it is not quite correct to
say that the argument for the military as a modernizing
force rests on the proposition that military groups have
more modern attitudes and are more advanced than civilian
elements. McWilliams reports that;
Military organizations are vary rarely innovators,
and that at hest they follow changes initiated in
other states or other sectors of society. Especially
if the military organizations are isolated from
external pressures for change, they tend to become
bastions of organizational conservatism. All
organizations show some tendency to defend
established routines, techniques, and patterns of
authority. But the military precisely because it
is able to rule by force, if far more able to
perpetuate such patterns than are civilian oq
organizations. ^
28Samuel P. Huntington, " Patterns of Violence in World
Politics," in Huntington, Changing Patterns in Military
Politics
,
(New York; Glencoe, 1962,) p. 36 .
^^Ibid .
,
p
.
36
.
^*^Wilson McWilliams, Garrisons and Government , op. cit . ,
p. 20
.
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Political Takeover
Janowitz distinguishes between two types of takeover:
the first is designed militarism which is the premeditated
search for political power, and the second is reactive
militarism, which is the expansion of military power that
results from the weakness of civilian institutions and the
pressures of civilians to expand the military role.
The situation of takeover is crucial to the ability of
a new military regime to consolidate itself in power and
will affect the relative priorities of the regime. One way
of specifying the conditions of takeover is according to the
ease or difficulty and to the extent of acquiescence or
resistance by other major political actors and by the
31
general populace.
^^Willner, "Perspectives," op . cit .
,
p. 264-65. She gives
the following specification in order of descending
degrees of e'^s^^t
(1) Positive acquiescence . The military is invited in,
and its entry is facilitated by the civilian head of
of the previous regime. Thus, a certain amount of
legitimacy is accorded to it by virtue of the cond-
itions of transfer. Examples are Pakistan and
Burma in 1958*
(2) Minimal or no resistance . The military is either
welcomed in or its entry easily acquiesced in be-
cause of disaffection with the previous regime.
Examples are Burma in 1962 and Ghana in 1966. Acqui-
escence and limited resistance may also be the
consequence of partial de facto control by the
military during the previous regime.
28
Finer suggests that there are four levels of military
intervention in politics, influence, blackmail, displace-
ment and supplantment. These levels of intervention are
attained by various methods, alone, or in conjunction with
one another. According to him. Influence is a perfectly
legitimate and constitutional method of convincing the
rulers to accept their point of view. This is done through
persuasion. When the military leaders threathen to use
some sanctions, i.e., threat of violence or non-cooperation,
should their advice not be followed, influence changes into
blackmail. Displacement of one civil government by another
civil government or supplantment of civilian regimes is
achieved by threats to revolt, refusal to defend the
government against civil disorder. ' The supplantment of
(3)
—
assistance
. There is actual resistance,
although it is not necessarily violent, tacit
resistance, or^ potential resistance by supporters
of the old regime, mainly comprising civilian
groups. An example is Egypt in I952-I954.
(^) Considerable resistance
. There is resistance to
the takeover either by_ military elements other than
the coup group, in addition to civilian resistance,
or by other_ elements of the armed forces loyal to
the old regime or competitive with and antagonistic
to the coup group. In extreme cases, this situation
can lead to civil or subcivil war. An example is
Indonesia in I965-I967.
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civil government can also take place through military take-
over v/ith or without violence, commonly known as coup.^^
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-he On Horseback
,
op. cit
.
, pp.addition to Finer's typology, the literatureincludes some other classifications; Janowitz's typology
classifies all civil-military relations in four major
models; aristocratic, democratic, totalitarian, andgarrison state (see Janowitz, Military of New Nations
,
app.;. Janowitz also distinguishes among the military asthe instrument of sovereignty, the military as a partnerin a political
^ bloc
, and the army as a ruling group.
Kurt Lang distinguishes between limited intervention,
occult intervention, and military takeover (see Military
Institutions and The Sociology of War
. Beverly Hills
;
Sage ^ Publications
, 1972
. ) Henry Bienen describes the
initial act of intervention~( i . e
. ,
coups
,
rebellions,
revolts,) the period after the seizure of power and the
institutionalization of power. Similarly Edward Feit
proposes a cyclical model through which military regimes
pass; The military take-over, the military-civilian ad-
ministrative alliance, cohesion without consensus (the
praetorian regime), and finally the downfall and replace-
ment ( see The Armed Bureaucrats
. Boston; Houghton-
Mifflin, 1973 ) • For other typologies, see Huntington,
Political Order in Changing Societies
, pp. 195-237; I.L.
Horowitz, " The Military Elites," in Elites in Latin
America
,
S. Lipset and A. Solari, p. 168; David C.
Rapport,^" A Comparative Theory of Military and Political
Types," in Samuel Huntington, Changing Patterns of
Military Politics
. New York; Glencoe, 1962, pp. , 7I-IOO.
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The first consideration before the military after the
takeo/er is to see that a firm control has been established
all over the country and the decrees issued by them are
effective. If it is not able to consolidate its position,
it cannot take measures to fulfill the promises made at the
time of takeover. The military either enters as a care-
taker government or to introduce far reaching changes in the
political, social and economic structure of the society and
to give what they consider suitable form of government.
When the military acts as "constitutional caretaker,"
it generally does not try to effect any basic changes in the
structure of political institutions. Rather it regards its
role as that of establishing the conditions within which
existing constitutional arrangments
, can be made effective.
This situation is to be distinguished from those in which
the military assumes power and endeavors to create new
political institutions that, in the long run, will provide
for effective civilian government
.
It cannot be taken for granted that armed forces are
indeed perceived by their populations as the carriers of
nationhood. The prestige of an army may not be transfera-
ble into legitimacy for rule. It is not simply that the
oy
See Fred Von DerMedhen, op. cit
.
,
pp. 94-100, where
he distinguishes among: "The military as constitutional
caretaker," "The military as spearhead of reform or' rev-
olution," and "The military as backer of civilian gov't."
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army is ineffective as a ruler; the indigenous political
cultures of traditional or modern sectors of a country may
militate against army legitimacy.
Whether the army acts in a premeditated way or reacts
to a breakdown of civilian rule affects its legitimacy as
ruler. And whether an army coup calls into question the
rule of a particular leader, a government, or the legiti-
macy of a state system determines in part the new pattern
which will emerge.'^
As agents of political change, the military cannot
avoid the popular goal of increased economic activity and
a higher standard of living. In fact, modernization is a
more overriding political objective than establishing a
claim to legitimate authority. But to modernize the
economy of a new nation it is necessary to develop mass
participation in new forms of social organization, ranging
from village cooperatives to professional associations.
If a prime political objective is persuasion rather than
coercion, it becomes necessary to judge the effectiveness
34
_
See Janowitz, op. cit .
,
p. 16 , 85 , and 113 *
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of a military oligarchy in domestic politics in terms of the
military's ability to develop or permit the development of
a mass political base.^^
How much political talent and legitimacy specific
armed forces have is a matter for investigation in each
case. Bienen suggests that what we can perhaps generalize
about is the ability of the military to get down to the
grass roots. If the military cannot do this, then by
definition rule is limited. Also if the military is to
rule, it cannot stand above politics but it must be a
political actor. Thus, a major claim for the military--
that it represents the entire nation and is perceived by
citizens to be above political strife—ceases to be viable
once the military gains power. It loses legitimacy as its
claim to stand above conflicting groups is called in
question. No longer can the military be convincing in its
assertion that xu embodies the essence of nationhood, for
it appears to act simply as another claimant for power
beset by its own internal divisions.
The decline of confidence in the government enhances
the position of the military. The Generals, who despise
the governments' handling of affairs, can resort to black-
mail or overthrow the discredited regime as was done by
their predecessors. Thus the story of military inter-
33
vention in a country does not end with one coup. Once the
tradition of civilian supremacy is eroded and the military
intervenes in politics, it cannot adopt apolitical posture.
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CHAPTER II
THE MILITARY IN PAKISTAN
The military in India was organized on the modern
lines by the British. It was in 1895 that the three armies
of the presidencies of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras were
amalgamated and put under the C-in-C of India.
The Governor-General
-in-Council exercised executive
authority over the army which, under the Charter Act of
1833, was responsible for the superintendence, direction
and control of the civil and military affairs in India.
The C-in-C was the head of the army and ex-officio member
of the Governor-General's Executive council. In addition
to the C-in-C, the Executive Council had a military member,
who was advisor to the Governor-General (Viceroy) and was
in charge of the Military Department.
The Government of India Act, 1919 brought about no
change in the control of defense affairs of India. The
Governor-General-in-Council
, responsible to the British
Parliament through the Secretary of State for India, had
the control over the military and defense affairs. He was
assisted by the C-in-C, who was also a member of the
Executive Council and was entitled to attend the meetings
of both the Houses of the Indian legislature established
35
by the act of I919. The Indian legislature had no control
over defense and defense expenditure. It served only as a
platform where the Indian political leaders reviewed the
government policy of excluding legislative control over
defense, the use of the army to control political agitation
and its use outside the sub-continent, and the pace of
Indianization of the commissioned ranks of the army.
They could not compel the government to accept any part-
icular demand.
The Indian political leaders frequently demanded that
the legislature be given control over the defense expendi-
ture and the Defense Department be transferred to a
Minister who would be responsible to the legislature. The
British government, however, was not willing to depart
from the existing pattern of military administration.
The Government of India Act, 1935 made no change of
any consequence in the organization and administration of
the military of India. During the British rule, subordi-
nation to the civil authority was emphasized as the
cardinal principle of the organization of the military.
The military served as an instrument to pursue the policies
laid down by the civil govemment--the government in
London through the civil authorities in India. The
36
military performed four major functions; The defense of
India from external aggression, particularly from the
passes of the north-west; the control of the Pathan tribes;
participation in the military expeditions of the British
government outside Indian territory; and the provision of
assistance to civil administration to maintain law and
order and restore authority.^
The Indian troops were used by the British government
in military expeditions outside India. Prior to 1914, the
Indian Army units had fought in Abyssinia, Afghanistan,
Burma, China, Egypt and East Africa. During World War I,
India s formations participated in the war in France,
t Palestine, Iraq, Persia and East Africa. The story
of World War II was not much different. The Indian army
rendered outstanding service in Italy, North Africa,
Abyssinia, Syria, Iraq, Burma, Malaya and Hong Kong.
Various social, political and educational reforms
introduced by the British government created a class of
people orientated to western ideas. The growth of an
Anglo-India press, the introduction of local self-govern-
ment and the railways brought about a mental revolution
amongst this class of people. With the turn of the
century, various other influences entered the Indian
1Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan
(Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 197^) i p • 247
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The experience of World War I and the ambition for
Dominion status made the political leaders of the Congress
and the Muslim League give serious thought to the problem
of national defense. They stressed that their goal of
Dominion status for India could not be realized if defense
was permanently left in the hands of the British govern-
ment. They demanded control over defense, resented the
military expenditure--which constituted the largest single
item in the budget--and demanded a speedy Indianization
of the army. Despite their continuous efforts, however,
i^^*l^snce in defense matters remained minimal until
the end of the British rule; and they had no direct exper-
ience in handling the affairs of the military.^
The Division and Nationalization of The Armed Forces
In 1940, the Muslim League formally adopted the idea
of a separate homeland for the Muslims of India as its
objective. This was an expression of the desire of the
Muslims to preserve and promote their culture and civili-
zation and safeguard their national interests. The move-
ment gained such a momentum that by the end of 1946 the
2
See Hasan Askari Rizvi, op . cit
.
,
p. 21.
38
the creation of Pakistan had become inevitable. This
raised the question of the future of the armed forces of
British India--whether the sub-continent would continue to
be treated as one unit so far as defense was concerned and
the new states of India and Pakistan would have a joint
control of the armed forces; or the armed forces would be
divided along with the division of the sub-continent.^
When the Muslim League put forward the idea of the
division of the Indian armed forces, the British government
did not welcome it. The Military High Command was of the
opinion that the division of the armed forces would be
suicidal for and institution which they and their pre-
decessors had established with the hard labor of nearly
two centuries. They claimed that the two armed forces would
not be able to attain the degree of effeciency which
marked the organization of the British Indian armed forces.
The Muslim League leadership was firm in its demand
for the division of the armed forces along with the part-
ition of the sub-continent. They were conscious of the
fact that the new state of Pakistan would be dangerously
enfeebled if she did not possess her own armed forces.^
^ Ibid
.
,
p . 25
.
\bid.
, p. 26.
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All efforts to keep the armed forces united proved
useless. The British government not only acceded to the
partition of India but also decided to divide the armed
forces between India and Pakistan. The political leader-
ship agreed to divide India into two states. The division
of the troops was completed without much difficulty. By
August 15, 1947, the future of the units had been decided.^
Characteristics of Pakistan’s Army--Past and Present
As Fazal Muqueem Khan has pointed out, the Pakistan
army in an "army young in years, but rich in tradition."^
In Morris Janowitz's classification, it is an"ex-colonial
army as contrasted with a "national liberation" or "post-
liberation" army
. The Pakistan army, formed August 14,
1947 when Pakistan achieved independence, was created with
approximately 150,000 officers and men previously part of
o
Britian's Indian army.
The military inherited the high standard of British
training and experience of the two world wars. It was
•^Hasan Askari Rizvi, op . cit
. , p. 28.
Fazal Muqueem Khan, The Story of The Pakistan Army
,
(Kara-
chi: Oxford University Press
,
I963 )
,
p . T~.
7Morris Janowitz, The Military in The Political Development
of New Nations, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1964), p. 10-11.
0
The figure is taken from "The Pakistan Army"
,
Asian
Review
,
Vol. LV : January 1959*
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disciplined and cohesive and was perhaps one of the most
organized institutions in Pakistan. According to Edward
Shils, "of the new states, only India and Pakistan in-
herited large, well
-trained armies experienced in warfare
and governed by an officer class with a modem military
tradition.
Another factor making the Pakistan army tradition
rather than revolutionary in outlook is that the leadership
of the army has tended to be political conservative. Many
officers are landowners or come from large landowning
1
0
families. Janowitz reported that "only two of a sample
of fifty-three nation-states, Pakistan and, to a lesser
degree, Egypt, could be said to have a significant number
of officers recruited from aristocrats or landed gentry
groups at the time of national independence."^^
9
Edward
^ Shils
, "Armies in The Process of Political
Modernization," in J.J. J. Johnson, (ed.
)
The Role of
The Military in Underdeveloped Countries
. Princeton:
Princton University Press, 1962, p. 40.
10See Raymond Moore, "The Army as a Vechicle For Social
Change in Pakistan", Journal of The Developing Areas,
II (October I 967 ), p. 59 .
^Aorris Janowitz, op. cit
.
.
p. 50 .
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In spite of its traditional orientation, the Pakistan
army was called upon to fulfill a wide variety of non-
traditional duties. A series of national emergicies
after independence contributed to the army’s non-
military activities. Floods and cyclones, locust in-
vasions, crop devastation by wild boars, food shortages in
East Pakistan and even smuggling operations all required
army handling after civilian authorities found themselves
unable to cope with these problems.
The army was willing to support any government, and
it helped the civil administration in the restoration of
law and order. An important reason the army was called
upon to involve itself in non-military affairs was that
its public image was respected as compared with that of
most other groups in the country. The army was apart
from and above politics. It was honest and disciplined.
The people, and even the politicians, regarded the army
as patriotic, helpful and firm but fair.^^
The army got the first chance to run civil adminis-
tration directly in 1953 » as a consequence of the out-
break of the anti-Ahmadi riots in the Punjab. In the
12See Raymond Moore, op. cit.,
^^Ibid
.
,
p. 60.
p . 60
.
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former province of West Punjab, religious disturbances
were staged by a coalition of the Ulama and several
political groups and punitive measures against the minority
sect of Qadianis were demanded. Politicians, both for
political and genuine religious reasons, were incapacita-
ted from taking any decisive action. When mobs led by
their leaders resorted to open lawlessness and destruction
of public property, the army was called out and martial
law was imposed in Lahore on March 6, 1953.
The martial law that was introduced ushered in a clean
and efficient administration with prices under control,
with goods available in the shops and with the streets and
roadslooking clean. The army successfully brought the
situation back to normal within a few days. Martial law
was withdrawn on May 14, and the city was handed over to
•
*1 /
1
the civil administration.
Thus
,
it is clear from the previous survey that the
military had become involved in civil administration but
did not assume a direct political role. The only instance
which showed the direct interest of a section of the
l4Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Role of The Military in Pakistan,"
in Armed Forces and Society; Sociological Essays, edited
by Jacques Van Doom, The Hague: Mouton, 1968, p. 288
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Of the military in politics was what became known as the
"Rawalpindi Conspiracy of 1951." On that occasion, a
group of senior officers was discovered plotting seizure
of government power, setting up a military dictatorship
patterned after the Communist model, and allegedly plan-
ning the military conquest of Kashmir. Fourteen members
of the conspiracy were found guilty and sentenced to
terms of up to twelve years after the trial went on for
eighteen months. ^5 Later, because of public sympathy and
the legal invalidation of the act under which they were
tried, all were set free in 1955. The conspiracy had no
effect on the morale of the armed forces, and the army as
a whole remained loyal to the government.
Thus, it may he concluded for a variety of reasons,
that the traditional army of Pakistan had been called upon
to perform a wide variety of non-traditional and non-
military activities in order to help preserve, stabilize
and build a new nation. With the passage of time, the
dependence on the military increased. The limited but
continued participation of the military in the civilian
affairs made the military an important factor in Pakistan.
15
~
The accused were tried under: "The Rawalpindi Conspiracy(Special Tribunal) Act, I 95 I."
16„ . .For a discussion of "The Rawalpindi Conspiracy," see
Keith Callard, Pakistan A Political Study
, London:
Allen & Unwin, 1958, p. 279 .
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Pakistan s Aid Ralationship with the U.S.
In the early 1950’s U.S. foreign policy was designed
to "contain" communism throughout Europe, Asia and Latin
America. To prevent Communist inspired "take-overs", the
U.S. attempted to establish a series of defense systems
designed to stregthen the capabilities of several "free
world nations to resist communism. The principal in-
centives employed by the U.S. to secure allies were
economic assistance and military hardware, and training.
In February 1951 and February 1952, Pakistan received
and increasing amount of aid from the United States, with
the stipulation that it was to be used only in consulta-
tion with the American government and with their approval.
The agreement also made clear that Pakistan could not
accept technical assistance from other countries "without
1 Rthe consent of the U.S. government."
In exchsnge for a U.S. commitment to modernize the
Pakistani armed forces, Pakistan agreed to allow the U.S.
to use Pakistani territory for surveillance activities of
17Robert LaPorte, Power and Privilege; Influence and
Decision-Making in Pakistan
,
Berkeley; University of
California Press, 1975» p» 150*
1
8
Tariq Ali, Pakistan; Military Rule or People's Power
,
London; Jonathan Cape, 1970, p. 72.
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of the Soviet Union. In addition, Pakistan became a
member of both CENTO and SEATO—defense arrangements in-
tended to "contain" both the U.S.S.R. and the People's
Republic of China.
After the Sino-Indian Border war of I962, Pakistan
reassessed its relations with the U.S. The Chinese threat
to India initiated a massive U.S. economic and military
assistance effort to India. Aid to India and U.S. discuss
ions of a "protective air umbrella" for India were seen
by Pakistan as "acts of betrayal" by the U.S.
Even before I962, Pakistan's military officers resent
ed the fact that the U.S. kept a tight control over the
flow of military aid so that Pakistan's military units
were never kept in a state of full operation for more than
a month or so. The officers complained that they were
"beggars", completely dependent on the U.S.^^
The U.S. military aid to Pakistan and India was cut
off following the outbreak of war in 1965. This decision
hit Pakistan harder than it did India because the Pakistan
Air force was equipped entirely with American aircraft,
19
Robert LaPorte, op. cit
.
,
p. 150.
20Khalid B. Sayeed, op . cit
.
,
p. 286 .
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whereas India had started receiving American arms only
since 1962. With the traditional sources of supply cut
off, Pakistan looked for new sources to secure equipment for
the three services of the military. Besides purchasing arms
from European countries, Pakistan secured military equip-
ment through Iran and Turkey, china became an important
source supply of weapons to Pakistan.
23After India and Pakistan won their independence, they be-came
_
involved in a^ bitter dispute over the status of theprovinces of Kashmir and Jammu (now called Kashmir).Open fighting broke out. In 1949, the United NationsSecurity Cornell set up a five-nation special committee,which negotiated a cease-fire, set up truce lines and
arranged for the demilitarization of the disputed area.This ceased the crisis only temporarily. The tension
existing between the two countries burst out into alarge-scale war in September of I965. Fighting broke
armies of India and Pakistan in the Rann
01 ^Kutch on the frontier between the Indian state ofGujrat and the Sind area of West Pakistan. Pakistan
succeeded in pushing back the Indian forces from thedisputed area. The war came to an end on September 23,1965,^ when India and Pakistan accepted the Security
council resolution of September 20, I965, calling upon
India and Pakistan to cease fire. In January I966,
the contending leaders (Ayub Khan and Shastri) flew
to a neighboring Soviet republic to sign the Declara-
tion of Tashkent, agreeing to withdraw their troops
from the disputed territory.
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Defense expenditure rose more rapidly during I962-70
than during the period of direct military rule in Pakistan
(1958-62). During 1958-62, the peak level of defense ex-
penditure was RS. 1112.4 million (I96O-61), which represen-
ted a rise of 11^ over the defense expenditure of 1958-59.
The defense expenditure registered a steady increase from
1962 untill It reached its peak level in I965-66, which
represented a rise of about 199^ over the defense expenditure
of 1962-63. Although the percentage of defense expenditure
to total expenditure was less than 50?^ during I963-64 and
1964 -65
.
the amount spent on defense was higher than in the
previous years. After I965-66, the defense expenditure went
down from its peak level but it was more than double the ex-
penditure of 1962-63. (See Tables 1 and 2) Defense ex-
penditure has invariably been kept between 55 to 60f. of the
country's total revenue.
The U.S. provided the bulk of military and
economic assistance extended to Pakistan since independence.
During the 1950 's and 60 's decisions taken in Pakistan, both
in foreign and domestic policy areas, were made within the
constraints posed by U.S. economic and military assistance.
The bilateral relationship that developed between the U.S.
and Pakistan since independence was cyclical in nature
24Hasan Askari Rizvi, op. cit
. ,p. 159.
48
TABLE I
Defense Expenditure (I958-62)
Year
Defense Expenditure Percentage ofUn million Rupees) the total
expenditure
1958-59* 966.5 50.9
1959-
60
1960-
61
1961-
62
1 » 0^3.5 56.51
1
,
112.4 58.73
1,108.6 55.80
* Covers the period of I5 months from April 1, I958 to
June 3 D> 1959 *
Source; Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Mil itary and Politics
in Pakistan
, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974
,
p. 160 .
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TABLE II
Defense Expenditure (1962-70)
Year
Defense Expenditure
(in million Rupees)
Percentage of
the total
expenditure1962-
63
1963-
64
1964-
65
1965-
66
1966-
67
1967-
68
1968-
69
1969-
70 (revised)
954.3 53.16
1,156.5 49.49
1,262.3 46.07
2,855.0 53.67
2,293.5 60.92
2,186.5 53.63
2
,
426.8 55.62
2,760.0 53.35
Source; Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics
Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974
,
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with definite peaks and valleys. 1962 through 1965 was the
period during which Pakistan received the largest amount of
U.S. aid per capita, although the late 1950’s and the first
two years of the 1960's have been described as the zenith in
U.S.
-Pakistan cooperation and relations. Another high
point in the relations (the early 1970's) coincided with a
period in which only minor military assistance and a re-
duced economic assistance program (in per capita terms)
existed. (See Table III)
East Pakistan and. The Armed Forces
As we have see, Pakistan inherited its military from
the British Indian Military, one of its legacies being the
recruitment policy from the so-called "martial races."
These martial races were the Pathans
, the Punjabi Muslims,
the Sikhs, the Rajputs, the Dogras
,
the Garhwalis, and the
Mahrattas. All these races lived in the northern and north'
western part of India with the exception of the Mahrattas.
The political and military experience in India and
keeness shown by the inhabitants of certain areas to join
the military profession, convinced them that certain races
(i.e., the above) furnished fine fighting men and that
25
Robert LaPorte, op
. cit
.
,
p. 143.
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table III
U.s. Government Grants and Credits to Pakistan
1953-1971
Year
pre-1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
Amount (in U.s.
8
99
12
67
154
100
145
142
229
218
323
380
377
349
221
331
282
209
239
Total 4, 101
Source; Robert LaPorte, Power and Privilese-
Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan~T
Berkeley; University of California Press, I975,
p. 145.
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certain races exhibited little or no aptitude for military
service. They found it convenient to recruit the bulk of
their army from the north and northwest of India. By the
time power was transferred to the new dominions of India and
Pakistan, it was generally believed in the military circles
of British India that the South Indians (particularly the
Madrasis) and the Bengalis were not as good soldiers as the
Punjabis, the Pathans and the Gurkhas. This made the Pakis-
tani military overwhelmingly West Pakistanian by origin.
The Bengali in East Pakistan formed the largest ethnic
group iSHfo of the population). They are also very different
from the people of the western wing in language, culture,
social structure, demographic features and historical
traditions. Bengal with a population of forty-five million
(in 1930), provided 7,000 combatant recruits: the Punjab with
a population of twenty million provided 3^9,000 suchrecruits?^
At the time of independence, there was no Bengali in-
fantry, and no Bengali officer held the rank above that of
a colonel. Partition of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent
and the establishment of Pakistan further reduced the number
of Bengalis in the army. The non-Muslim Bengali officers
and men opted for India. Thus, East Pakistanis formed only
1.% of the total strength of the armed forces in 19^7.^^
ZE ~
Report of the Indian Statutory Commission
. Vol. I,
London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1930
, p. 6I&97.
^"^Fazal Muqueem Khan, op. cit .
. p. 51
.
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The government attempted to do away with the British
recruitment policy so that the people of all regions could
have an equal opportunity to take part in the defense of the
country. It was bogged bogged down, however, by the large
number of political, administrative and financial problems
immediately arising after the independence, with these
conditions, the government did not make bold experiments for
the realization of its objective; it adopted the policy of
gradual induction of East Pakistanis in the armed forces.
After the I965 war between India and Pakistan,
publicity measures were increased to step up recruitment
from East Pakistan. The Government also agreed to fix a
quota for East Pakistanis in all regiments, but the details
of "tho quotia ware not disclosed.
The government; decided to raise the first exclusively
Bengali infantry regiment. By 1968, four such exclusive
regiments had been raised. These regiments had the distinc-
tion of being exclusively Bengali regiments. Ten more such
Bengali battalions were raised in I967-69. At the same
time, recruitment in other areas of arms and services was
also opened to East Pakistanis. These measures increased
the number of East Pakistanis in the three services of the
armed forces, but their representationtation was never in
proportion to their population. (See Table IV)
2 g
Hasan Askari Rizvi, op. cit
.
.
p. I76.
TABLE
IV
EAST
PAKISTANI
REPRESENTATION
IN
THE
MILITARY
ESTABLISHMENT,
1963
,
(percentage
of
total)
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The political leaders of East Pakistan criticized the
government 's recruitment policy and the measures adopted to
strengthen the defense of East Pakistan. They characterized
deliberate attempt to keep the eastern wing dependent
on West Pakistan in matters of defense and exclude East
Pakistanis from defense services. They also took exception
to defense expenditure, a large part of which was spent on
the saleries of the soldiers and officers (most of whom were
West Pakistanis) and the defense of West Pakistan.
The debate on defense expenditure and general dis-
cussions on the budget in the National Assembly clearly re-
flected their displeasure over the policy of gradual in-
duction of East Pakistanis in the armed forces. They be-
came more bitter in their criticism after Ayub's martial law.
The Ayub regime did not adopt any special policy to make the
military more nationally representative. The military was
interpreted as the symbol of West Pakistani ori rather,
Punjabi domination. This widened the gap between the
military and East Pakistanis.
29Ibid.
,
p. 178.
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CHAPTER III
PAKISTAN AS A NATION STATE
The period from 1947 to 1958 has been labeled as that
of parliamentary politics by many authors. An examination
of this period's political and decision-making processes
clues to sucessive periods.
Power was formally transfered by the British on
August 14, 1947, to a Pakistan Constituent Assembly. The
Assembly was a small body elected indirectly by the
provincial legislatures or the basis of one member for the
population of a million. It comprised seventy members?
of these forty-four were from East Bengal (later to become
the province of East Pakistan)
, seventeen from West
Punjab, five from Sind, three from Northwest Frontier
Province, one from Baluchistan, and one each from
Bahawalpur, Khairpur
, and the Northwest Frontier Province
states. The first meeting of the Assembly was held on
August 10, 1947, in Karachi. The next day it elected the
founder of the new nation, Quaid-i-Azam (great leader)
,
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, as its president.^
I ^
See Keith Callard, Pakistan-A Political Study, London:
Allen 8c Unwin, 1968, p. 118.
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While the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was engaged in
framing a constitution, the Assembly was also to act as
the country's legislature. M. A. Jinnah was appointed
Governor-General and Liaqat Ali Khan Prime Minister.
With the creation of Pakistan, Muhammed Ali Jinnah
remained the leader above all others. According to one
scholar
;
'As long as Jinnah was alive (he diedSeptember 1948 ) , he was Pakistan. He heldthe position of Governor-General, but thepowers and influence that he exercised were
associated with thatice. The Cabinet rarely functioned withoutIS directives. He was the supreme arbitratorbetween^ the Center and the provinces. HisPrime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, emerged asde facto Prime Minister only after his death.
Jinnah s decisions and desires became binding on the new
nation-state of Pakistan. His personal style was in-
corporated into the new office of Governor-General, which
established that office as one of unlimited and
unquestioned power and authority.
In organizing the national government in the early
days of 19^7 and 1948, Jinnah relied heavily on the
viceregal system developed by the British in pre-partition
India. Under this system, heavy reliance was placed upon
See Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan,
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, I 967
, p. 62 .
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the civil servants. Here the Civil Service (the bureau-
cracy) exercised their power with little interference
from politicians.^
Jinnah's death on September 11
, 1948, provided the
first major shock to the country and a loss that proved
irreparable. He was succeeded as Governor-General by
Khwaja Nazimuddin, the Chief Minister of E. Bengal, but
the real authority now moved to Prime Minister Liaqat Ali
Khan, who was second in popular esteem to Jinnah.
After Jinnah's death, Liaqat, as Prime Minister, con-
tinued in attempting to establish a parliamentary format
for politics nationally. He maintained his position as the
leader of the Muslim League} and during his tenure as both
party and national leader, the Constituent Assembly was
the focus for national debate and decision-making. How-
ever, he was not able to achieve any real success in
solving Pakistan's main problems. He was unable to
institute a program of economic and social reform and
unable to supress disruptive forces that had begun to emerge.^
Liaqat was assassinated October of 1951. After his
death, Pakistan began to drift toward disruption, corrup-
tion and inefficiency. There was no obvious political
successor to Liaqat. Khwaja Nazimuddin took over the
3Khalid Bin Sayeed, op. cit., p. 63 .
4See Damodar P. Singhal, Pakistan
,
New Jersey: Prentice
Hall, 1972
, p. 79 .
59
Prime Ministership; and Ghulam Muhammed, a former civil
servant and the Finance Minister, became Governor-General.
After four years of existence, Pakistan began to show
signs of restlessness. The consitution had not been
framed, and the Constituent Assembly had become a battle-
ground of factional and regional disputes. The economy
was in decline, there was a shortage of food, the dominant
Muslim League had lost influence and politicians engaged
in intrigue and squabbles. There was tension between East
and West Pakistan, and a sense of disillusionment prevailed
In April I953, Governor-General Ghulam Muhammed
dismissed Prime Minister Nazimuddin on the grounds of
incompetence following repercussions from the anti-
Ahmadiya riots. Nazimuddin was replaced by Muhammed Ali
Bogra. The Assembly, whose confidence Nazimuddin enjoyed,
was hastily prorogued and was not recalled until September,
by which time the new ministry was well established.
Nazimuddin 's unceremonious dismissal was the beginning of
political instability that lasted for the next five years,
and the emergence of the decline of parliamentary
democracy in Pakistan. The political, legal and psycholo-
gical repercussions of this action were far-reaching.'^
^Damodar P. Singhal, op. cit
.
,
p. 82 .
6o
The first major clash between East and West Pakistan
came about in 1952 over the question of a national language.
West Pakistan wanted Urdu, alone, to be the national language
because it had become a symbol of Muslim nationalism and
historical past. Proud of their own Bengali literary
tradition, the East Pakistanis (Bengalis) were deeply
disturbed at that claim and sought instead a recognition
of Bengali as a national language. They asserted that
more Pakistanis spoke Bengali than Urdu.^ Only about
seven percent of Pakistanis spoke Urdu, and it was not the
language of any region of Pakistan."^ The attempt was aban-
doned in 195^ after strong Bengali opposition, and both
Bengali and Urdu were recognized as national languages.
The political situation at the Center was also un-
satisfactory. Central politics could not be separated from
provincial politics. Politicians participated at both
levels and held membership in both the national and
provincial assemblies. Consequently, a small group of
about twenty individuals made all important political and
governmental decisions at every level. In particular, they
controlled the posts of central cabinet ministers, provin-
cial governors and provincial chief ministers.®
^According to the Census of Pakistan 1951 » 54.6^ spoke
Bengali, 28.4^ Punjabi, 7-2^ Urdu, 5 . 8^ Sindhi, 7-1^
Pushto, and 1.8^ Englsih.
7 - -See Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan; Failure in National Integra-
tion
,
New York; Columbia Univ. Press, 1972V p. 13..
0Keith Callard, op. cit
.
,
p. 26.
61
The proceedings of the Constituent Assembly were
characterized by factional and regional rivalries; in
particular, the Punjabi and Bengali groups engaged in a
fierce struggle for political ascendancy. Relations
between Governor-General Ghulam Muhammed and the Consti-
tuent Assembly became worse. The Assembly wanted to
curb the power of the Governor-General. On September 20,
195^1 it repealed the Public and Representative Offices
(Disqualification) Act of 1949 (PRODA), which provided for
the debarring from public life for a specified period of
time, persons found guilty of misconduct in any public
office or representative capacity.^ They also rushed a
bill without the prior knowledge of the Governor-General
to amend the Government of India Act to ensure that he
would not use the Act in any way to dismiss any other
ministry. The Governor-General, upon knowing this,
reacted sharply and dissolved the Constituent Assembly.^®
This resulted in the country being thrown into a serious
political-legal-constitutional crisis. Concurrently with
the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly, the
9See^Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in
Pakistan
,
Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 19?4, p. 67 .
0
The Governor-General, while dissolving the Constituent
Assembly
,
^ took the plea that it failed to produce a
constitution in seven years and had transformed itself
in a perpetual body, which had lost the confidence of
the people.
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Muslim League cabinet headed by Muhammed Ali Bogra was
also dismissed. The Governor-General appointed a new
cabinet, Muhammed Ali was asked to serve as Prime
Minister. Nine other members, including Commander-in-
Chief General Ayub Khan, Dr. Khan Sahib, H. S. Suhrawardy,
and Major-General Iskander Mirza, were appointed to the
cabinet. The army was brought closer to the administration
and the Civil Service, which was already a force in
Pakistan politics, gained greater power.
After more than seven years of existence, Pakistan
was in a precarious condition. There was no legislature,
no constitution, no unity among provinces and no political
stability or recognized leadership. Mosb of this period
was spent in trying to reach a constitutional consensus.
During these years, the only institutional developments
which occurred took place with the civilian and military
bureaucracies; cabinents and prime ministers came and went,
but the civil servants and the military leadership retained
positions of importance and power in the new state.
Political parties were shifting combinations of
political leaders, whose loyalty to a particular party
were not based on principles but political and ministerial
gains
.
^^Rizvi, op . cit .
.
p. 68.
12Robert LaPorte, Power and Privilege; Influence and
Decision-Making in Pakistan
,
Berkeley: Univ. of Calif.
Press, 1975» p- ^1*
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Keith Callard observed that:
Politics in Pakistan was made up of a
thpfr
leading persons, who withei political dependents, form loose
agreements to achieve power and to main-xain It. Consequently, rigid adherence to a
P ^ measure is likely to make apolitician less available for office. Thosewho lacked fixed ideas but who control legillatures, money or influence have tended toprosper. "J-J
The weak political leadership and ceaseless struggle
for power shifted real political power from the National
Assembly to the head of state (Governor-General previously,
and President since 1956), and had a strong tradition of
violating the norms of parliamentary democracy was estab-
lished. The politicians were divided in so many camps that
they were not able to adopt a united stand to restrict the
greater concentration of powers in the hands of the head
of state.
The composition of the second Assembly was quite
^iPPs^snt from that of the first in which E. Bengal had
had the majority of seats; in the second, the two wings of
the country were given equal representation. The seats
totalled eighty--forty to be filled by East Pakistan and
the remainder by the various units of West Pakistan. The
members were to be elected by the existing provincial
legislatures. The elections were held in June 1955, and
the Assembly had its first meeting in July.^^
13 ;
'
'
~7
Keith Callard, op. cit
.
, p. 67 .
" ‘
14
See Damodar Singhal, op. cit
.
,
p. 86 .
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No single party commanded a majority in the second
Constituent Assembly. The Muslim League was still the
largest group with twenty-six members, followed by the
United Front (sixteen seats) and the Awami League (twelve
seats). Chaudhri Muhammed Ali, elected leader of the
Muslim League, formed a coalition ministry, comprising
the Muslim League and the United Front. The second
Assembly functioned in much the same way as the first.
In July 1955f Muhammed Ali Bogra was replaced as prime
minister by Chaudhri Muhammed Ali; and in September 1955,
Governor-General Ghulam Muhammed resigned due to illness.
His replacement was Iskander Mirza.
An important measure of this new assembly was the
establishment of the West Pakistan Act, passed in September
1955» which provided for the merger of the princely states,
Karachi and four provinces—the Punjab, the Northwest Fron-
Sind and Baluchistan— into one unit called West
Pakistan. A major consideration was to "balance" the poli-
tical strength and maneuverings of East Pakistan by working
out a solid West Pakistan against a solid East Pakistan.
The one unit plan, met with widespread opposition, especially
15 ;
~~
The United Front was a loose coalition of the major
parties--the Krishak Sramik and the Awami League--and
several minor parties. All were united in their desire
for ^ autonomy for East Bengal (the province of East
Pakistan) and their determination to secure the defeat
of the Muslim League.
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in the Northwest Frontier and Sind. The opponents
contended that the plan would extinguish local cultures,
and political identities, and that the largest group in
the unit (Punjabis) would dominate West Pakistan. There
was so much opposition that in October of I954, the
Governor-General dismissed the provincial governments of
the Punjab and Sind. Agreement was finally reached on the
basis that for the first ten years the Punjabis would get
less representation than that to which their number entitled
them—forty percent--the rest, sixty percent, to be equally
divided between the Sindhis and Pathans
.
On February 29, 1956, the second Assembly adopted a
constitution that came into force on March 23, The final
debate and proceedings were marked by bitterness from
those who were not members of the governing coalition. A
number of opposition leaders and parties walked out of the
Assembly in protest. The constitution provided for a
federa, unicameral and parliamentary system of government
with a strong center, adult franchise and direct elections.
The National Assembly was to have three hundred members
divided equally between East and West Pakistan. An
electoral college consisting of the national and provincial
1
6
Damodar Singhal, op. cit., p.l72
17Keith Callard, op. cit
.
,
p. 121.
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assemblies was to elect the president, in whom was vested
executive authority in the conduct of which he was advised
by the Prime Minister and the cabinet.^®
The political situation in Pakistan did not improve
after the introduction of the constitution. Pakistan still
had no organized political life, and there were hardly any
national political parties. Politics continued to be
marked by strife and rivalries. The instability of the
parliamentary period is witnessed by the frequent changes
of prime ministers that occured. From 1947 until the
coup in 1958, Pakistan had a total of seven prime ministers.
From September 1956 until October 1958, four individuals
occupied this position.
In East Pakistan, the same conditions prevailed.
All Bengalis were united in their resentment of the Center
and West Pakistan, hut they were divided into various
groups. The United Front, Which consisted mainly of the
Awami League and the Krishak Sramik Party, had collapsed;
and both engaged in political rivalry.
The political scene became one of chaos. Both the
Central and Provincial governments were short lived and
1
8
Singhal, op. cit
.
,
p. 87 .
19Robert LaPorte, op. cit., p. 4l.
6?
ineffective, political parties declined and broke up
into factions, and violence and corruption in public life
gathered strength. The Punjabi politicians fought among
themselves, as well as with Sindhis and Pathans. In West
Pakistan, Khan Sahib, a political leader, was assassinated
in May 1958; and in the East Pakistan legislature, the
Deputy Speaker Shahed Ali was fatally injured in September
of the same year during a fight between rival groups in
the Assembly. The Speaker had already been declared
insane and ejected from the House.
Political confusion gave rise to a general feeling
of economic insecurity, and by late 1958 the country was
in the grip of an economic crisis. The rich hoarded food
and smuggled gold. Foreign exchange holdings descended
to the danger point. Food riots broke out in East
Pakistan and labor strikes became common. Public morals
and respect for political institutions lowered. The
lack of leadersnip and regional tensions brought about
the collapse of the short-lived experiment in Pakistani
parliamentary government.
20
Hasan Askari Rizvi, op. cit
.
.
p. 92.
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CHAPTER IV
THE MILITARY REGIME I958-I962,
Phase I
The disintegration of political life in Pakistan
ultimately led to the military coup in October 1958. The
military take-over and the declaration of Martial Law was
completed in two phases. The first began on October 7 , I958.
President Iskander Mirza abrogated the Constitution; dissolved
the Central and Provincial Assemblies, dismissed the Central
and Provincial Cabinets, banned political parties, and
appointed General Ayub Khan as the supreme commander of the
armed forces and Chief Martial Law Administrator.
Twenty days later the second phase started when the
Army Generals forced Iskander Mirza to resign the office of
the President so that "the new regime could dissociate with
a person who was closely connected with the conditions which
led to political confusion in the country." On October 27,
1958, General Ayub Khan combined in himself the offices of
the President and the Chief Martial Law Administrator. He
became the undisputed ruler of the country. He relinquished
the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
appointed General Muhammed Musa as the new Commander-in-
6y
Chief the same day,^
The military take-over in Pakistan was neither a
revolution nor a revolutionary coup, it was a classic case
of a "reform coup."^ it was brought about by men who were
already participants in the existing political system and
who had had institutional bases of power within that system.
Long before the coup, the military had been working as a
partner in the civil
-military bureaucratic coalition that
held the key decision-making power in the country.^
A reflection of Ayub's experience as Commander-in-
Chief of the Army was seen in his conviction that Pakistan's
problems could be solved if things were properly investigated;
right decisions made and enforced. When ever there was some
serious problem concerning the reorganization of the army,
he appointed an expert committee to study the problem.
After the receipt of the report, he issued the necessary
orders. He adopted this same method to eradicate problems
of the political system. He appointed various commissions
1
Rizvi
,
op. cit
. , p. 94 .
2
S. P. Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics,"
in Changing Patterns of Military Politics
, p. 33. Accord-
ing to Huntington in a reform coup "a combination of
military and civilian groups seizes power intending to
make reforms in the political, economic or social
structure .
"
3Rounaq Jahan, op. cit
.
,
p. 52.
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and co^^ittees to repent on different matters and he sought
to implement the recommendations of those commissions by
Martial Law orders.^
Although martial law remained in force, the troops
were soon relieved of their civil duties and ordered back
to their barracks on November 10, 1958. The army largely
depended on the civil administration (the bureaucracy), the
steel frame of the old British administration, to run the
country .
5
Their dependence on the civil administration was
partly due to the limitations of the military to run the
civil administration exclusive of the civil servants and
partly due to the fact that the army consolidated its
position without any difficulty. The civil servants who
had in fact, run the government in the past, easily shifted
their loyalties to the new leaders.
The military decided to remain in the background,
while the civil bureaucracy was very visible. The civil
servants were assigned to influential positions. "Of the
two-hundred and eighty members of the thirty-three major
commissions formed by the regime for the purpose of suggest-
ing substantive policy changes, nearly 6o percent were
4See Hasan Askari Rizvi, op
. cit
.
,
p. 100.
firing. The Ayub Khan Era; Politics in Pakistan .
N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1971
,
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members of the clvil-hureaucracy
, only 6.4 penoent were
military, and 5 percent each were lawyers, judges, and
scholars. Politicians comprised barely 1.4 percent of the
comission’s membership. civil servants not only had a
monopoly over the policy-mahing jobs in the central and
provincial governments but also gradually took over the
diffemet corporations and autonomous bodies. This
operation of martial law through the civil machinery did
not mean that the real power was in the hands of the civil
service, rather "the army served as the brains and the
civil servants as the hands of the new regime.
The composition of the President’s eleven man
cabinet reflected a mixture of civil and military leader-
ship and did not include any prominent politicians. Exclud-
ing General Ayub Khan, the cabinet included three Lleutenent-
Generals, three public servants, one businessman, an
educationalist, one former ambassador, a well known
practicing lawyer from Lahore, and a young lawyer from Sind.
Martial law remained in force until June 8, 1962.
During this time dissent was muted. President Ayub issued
regulations prescribing severe punishment for anti-social
activities including, smuggling, hoarding, black-
Rounaq Jahan, oq
. c it
.
.
"^Hasan Rizvi, op , cit
. .
p. 58.
p. 100
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marketeering, and abduction of women and children
balances of the abolished political parties were
• Bank
frozen.
Prominent politicians were detained. Anti-corruption
councils were
members of the
was organized
landed gentry.
set up to hear charges brought against
civil service, and a Land Reforms Commission
in West Pakistan, to break the hold of the
A rehabilitation committee was organized
to tackle the refugee problem, and 40,000 new quarters
were constructed in a new town called Korangi. Ayub set
up the Law Reforms Commission on November 23, 1958 and on
December 12 he announced the appointment of a commission on
national education. 8
One change in the elite structure under the new regime
was the virtual removal of the political elite from power.
As pointed out earlier, with the coup the constitution was
abrogated, political parties abolished, and the established
political process was completely halted. The regime held a
very dim view of the politicians motivations and capabili-
ties, and did not expect to share power with the political
elite. In fact, some of the early measures of the regime
were directed specifically against prominent political
leaders. To eliminate their influence and to keep the
Lawrence Ziring, op. cit
.
, p. l4 .
politicians out of offices of responsibility, two orders.
Public Offices (Disqualification) Order (PODO) and the
Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order (EBDO) were pro-
mulgated in 1959. The terms of the PODO were not much
different from the PRODA of 1949. It applied to all those
who held public offices and were found guilty of misconduct
and corruption. It was applied with retroactive effect
from August 14. 1947. The former ministers, deputy
ministers, parliamentary secretaries and members of legisla
tive bodies charged for misconduct had the option to retire
from public life for a period of six years beginning
January 1. i960 or to take their case to a special tribunal
under the EBDO. The majority accepted the option to
disqualify themselves and withdrew from public life.
On March 5» I960, the EBDO was amended to include all
persons who had retired, resigned, or been dismissed from
government service. Karl Von Vorys claims that "approxima-
tely 7,000 persons were excluded from political life."^
According to Lawrence Ziring, a constant theme
remained during the Ayub era:
9See Karl Von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan.
Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. l8'9-90
.
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Ayub was fully aware that the intellisen<^i a
an^^h^
"democracy with parliamentary systemsd the fear now persisted that the aLndonmentparliamentary government would mean the endof self-government as well Convinced tLtparliamentary government in Pakistan's socio-cultural milieu was synoymous with politicalinstability,
^ he steadfastly refused to con-sider Its reinstatement. Hence holding hiscritics at bay absorbed much of his energy, lo
The President then moved to reduce the remainder of the
opposition, the press. On April 26, i960, the Press and
Publications Ordinance was issued. The ordinance covered
the whole of Pakistan and specified the conditions under
which a newspaper could be commandeered by the authorities.
All journals adhered to the dictates of the Martial Law
regime and refrained from making critical judgements on
government policies.
10
11
See Lawrence Ziring, op. cit ., p. lO.
See Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan,
Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1967, p. 123.
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After the assumption and consolidation of power, it
becomes essential for the military rulers to Justify their
action. First, they attempt to convince the people that
they were not interested in politics, hut since, conditions
had deteriorated to such an extent they could no longer sit
and watch the ruination of the country as silent
spectators. Second, they take certain steps to reform the
social and political structure and Introduce measures to
improve the living conditions of oommen men. The military
leaders of Pakistan found ample material available to
justify their assumption of power. They successfully
created the impression that they assumed power to eradicate
the evils which had crept into the economic, social and
political life of Pakistan during the last eleven years and
to Introduce a system of government keeping in view the
country's circumstancws and conditions. The new regime cla-
imed it was determined to solve the problems facing the
political system of Pakistan.
According to the Ayub regime, the previous political
institutions had failed in Pakistan because they were alien
institutions borrowed from the west and superimposed on a
traditional society. The regime therefore started build-
ing new political institutions. The regime developed two
?6
major political institutions, the Basic Democracies and
the constitution of 1962.
.he following discussion will
center on these two institutions.
The regime’s first attempt at political institution
building was the establishment of the system of local
bodies known as the Basic Democrats. According to their
author it was designed to give a more meaningful partici-
pation to the rural areas. Democracies were
designed to accomplish multiple political objectives. They
were expected to mobilize the masses of the people, especia
lly in rural areas for development activities, and to give
the people a sense of active participation in local affairs
Ayub gave the following rationale behind the program!
First
, this type of democracy will not beloisted upon the people from above. InsteadIt will work from below gradually going tothe top. Second, the people will not haveto go far from their neighborhood to electtheir representatives The third factor
which IS of considerable significance is thatthe council which will be formed will be freefrom the curse of
_
party intrigues, political
pressures and politicians that characterized
the assemblies in our country in the past. I 3
The Basic Democracy scheme was formally introduced in
October 1959. The country was divided into 80,000 con-
12
See Avub Khan, Speeches and Statements. Volume II,
pp. 24-25.
^^Ibid
.
,
p. 25 .
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stiencies (later raised to 120,000). each with an average
population of about 1.000. Both provinces
-East and West
Pakistan--were given an equal number of seats. Each
constituency elected on the basis of universal suffrage a
representative called a Basic Democrat. About ten such
constituencies formed a Union Panchayat or Council, which
became the basic or lowest unit of a four tiered adminis-
tration. At each level the elected representatives of the
people or their delegates were mixed with the nominees of
the government and given limited authority to be exercised
under the guidance of government officials, who were de-
signated as "controlling authorities" in the Basic Democrats
Ordinance of 1959. They possessed unlimited power to
suspend resolutions, prohibit decisions, and enforce
directives
.
A major rationale behind the Basic Democracies was
that they would help to legitimate the Ayub regime. As a
first step toward civilianization, the regime needed a
support base seperate from the military. It was hoped that
the new cadre of rural leadership created by the Basic
Democracies would be imbued with the regime's ideas and
14
See Damodar Singhal, op. cit
.
,
p. 95 .
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would mobilize mass support for the regime's policies and
programs. The Basic Democracies were to work in cooperation
with the government officials in the local councils and
would thus help to create a link between the urban areas
and the countryside. Thus the Basic Democracies were ex-
pected to do what political parties do.^^
The Basic Democracies did not form a national body as
political parties do in other countries. There were no
horizontal links between the Basic Democracies in the two
wings. There was no built-in mechanism to develop a
consensus on national issues or to train and promote national
leaders. A major limitation of the Basic Democracies plan
was that participation was limited by domination of govern-
ment officials and council chairmen. Structurally, except
for the lowest tier, in the other tiers, government
officials and the appointed members out-numbered the elected
members. An early study of the Basic Democracies found
that "eighty-five percent of the items on the agenda for
discussion at the Union Council meetings were initiated by
letters and visits from government officials." Also most of
the council resolutions were taken as a "face saving device
15Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan Failure in National Integration
,
op. cit
.
,
p. 112.
1 A
See KarlVon Vorys, op. cit
.
,
p. 15^-55*
17See A.T.R. Rahman, Basic Democracies At The Grass Roots ,
Comilla: PARD
, 1962, p. 31.
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to show compliance with the government directive,- 18
Also, popular participation as distinct from partici
pation by the Basic Democrats was very restricted. One
study found an actual decline in popular participation.
According to the report;
...Officers and Union Councillors agreed to
villages and to take the
works program on theirown shoulders. In many Unions, no meetingswere held in the project areas to discuS theaudit reports... In some thanas only one meet-ting was held. 19 ^
Moreover, due to fear of being victimized and a desire to
win favor, the members did not take steps to displease the
bureaucrats associated with these institutions. The
ignorance of the members to run the affairs of their
councils increased their dependence on the bureaucrats.
"In East Pakistan eighty-one percent of the Chairmen, and
seventy percent of the Union Councillors admitted that the
Circle Officers had helped them in framing their budget.
Another observer notes that "the Union Councils did
a useful job in improving the conditions of villages,
A.T.R. Rahman, op
. cit
.
.
p. 59.
See A.T.R. Rahman, An Evaluation of The Rural Works
Program-East Pakistan, 1963-64, Comilla; PARD. 1
pp. 18-19
.
20See Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan.
op. cit
. ,p. 253.
80
construction of roads, culverts and various other projects
But the Basic Democracies system could not produce a class
Of new leaders, independent in their outlook. Generally
power remained concentrated in the hands of those already
enjoying
By 1964 the Basic Democracy system had demonstrated its
tremendous economic and political patronage, wealthy
farmers reeemerged due to an increased interest in the
Basic Democracy system. The 1964 election saw the return
to power of a higher income group, a new rural elite. The
old elite had been thelanded aristooracy--the Zamindars
(landlords) and the Talukdars (petty landlords )
-the Basic
Democrats were generally from non-traditional
, nouveau
riche families. They were rich farmers, not landlords. ^2
Also the Basic Democracies saw a rise in the participation of
a new moneyed class--businessmen and contractors. The
regime was thus partially successful in fostering the
growth of a new rural elite whose economic and political
power was dependent on the regime’s policies.
See Rizvi, op. pit
.
.
p. 134 .
21
22See Rounaq Jahan, op. cit
.
.
p. 122.
23
farmers and the businessmen and contractorsbenefitted economically from the regime's policies. Aswe shall discuss in a subsequent chapter, the regime's
evelopment policies helped rich farmers more thanlandless labor.
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How far was this new elite successful in recruiting
political support for the regime? As for this question,
some observers of Pakistani politics noted that the Basic
Democracies and works program succeeded in recruitin at
least rural East Pakistani support for the regime and they
pointed to the outcome of the I965 election. ^3 But did this
rural support imply only support of rural Basic Democrats
or of the rural populace at large? Even though the Basic
Democracies may have recruited support, the fact remains
that the regime depended more on government officials than
on the Basic Democrats. As pointed out earlier, the
different tiers of the Basic Democracies werelinked not
through their own political hierarchy but through the
administrative hierarchy. The Basic Democracies were thus
more like a government agency. Instead of recruiting support
for the regime it depended on the regime for survival.
It is posited here also, that even if the Basic Democracies
program mobilized the people in the rural areas, that
mobilization was more economic, than political. It is also
23See Khalid Bin Sayeed, "I965 an Epoch Making Year in
Pakistan," Asian Survey
, Vol. VI (Feb. I966), p. 79.
Rehman Sobhan, Basic Democracies, Works Programs and
Rural Development in East Pakistan
, Dacca: Oxford
University Press, 1968, p. 257.
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important to point out a oruoial and controversial aspect
of the Basic Democracies, and that was their use as the
electoral college for Presidential and Assembly elections
As demonstrated this left them open to government pressure
and manipulation.
Rounaq Jahan analyses the Basic Democracies system
as achieving only limited success in its goal of closing
the elite mass gap. and as a device for overhauling the
political structure of the country, she states;
limiting urban participation, butfailed to fully mobilize the rural areaq mo
rural elite created by the Basic Democrats hadnarrow social base and limited capability in recruiting mass support for the regime. The rural
BSrthpf off in\bsolutrtermstut ey were not won to the regime, since richbusinessmen, and contractors made more
nmioi greater gains. By disfranchising therban areas, the Basic Democracies alienated thepreviously mobilized and semi
-mobilized groups,and the groups it enfranchasized were not largeenough to counteract urban dissatisfaction. Fin-ally, by monopolizing electoral rights the systemalienated all groups who looked upon it as the
mechanism by which the regime perpetuated itself.
24
Rounaq Jahan, op. cit
.
.
p. 126.
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The constitution of 1962 was the second part of Ayub's
political institution building. After securing a vote of
confidence of the Basic Democrats through a form of
referedum, on February 17. i960, the President appointed an
eleven-member Constitution Commission. It consisted of
eminent judges, lawyers and others. The Commission was
asked to examine the progressive failure of the parliamen-
tary government in Pakistan and to submit proposals. ^5
The Constitution Commission toured both wings of
Pakistan and issued a questionnaire. In all 6,269 replies
to the questionnaire were sent and five-hundred and sixty-
five persons were interviewed.
A
member of the intelli-
gentsia, former Prime Minister Choudhri Muhammed Ali, was
one of the respondents. His reply was considered very
significant and received great publicity. It appeared in
Pg-^isfan Times of Lahore on June I3, i960 and stressed
the importance of reviving the parliamentary system. He
cautioned that the Presidential system would lead to a
personal dictatorship. When more responses to the
Commission's questionnaire revealed substantial opposition
25
D. Singhal, 00. cit .
.
p. 96.
2 ^
.
H. Rizvi, op. cit
.
,
p. 136.
to some of the
couraged.
^sgime
' s concepts, public debate was dis-
The Commission's recommendations were short of the
President's objectives, far from his public statements,
and in conflict with his own thinking. They were mainly
against writing the Basic Democracies scheme into the
constitution and declaned;
unler°Se constitution
been for the fact that bot
Which may "e\omfnecIsk^Ss'^xp^cf
wor*kin£T nf ^ . “xpemen e of the
consi?StiL wou!fbfre1ufreT"’we”®"‘*Ta®"h°"
regard it only as an eSSf^haw! therefore.
According to Ziring, having been disfranchised by the
proclamation of martial law, the Consitutional Commission
may have appeared to afford the intelligentsia their last
opportunity to alter the Basic Democracies system before
It became "enshrined in a constitutional document."
Ayub was distressed to witness the Commissions’ low regard
for his Basic Demociacies and other preferences. Accepting
Its report would mean accepting limitations on his authori?
27
28
29
Dawn (Karachi), July 6, I961.
Constitution C ommission
. Karachi.Government of Pakistan Press , 196I
,
pi 70T
See Lawrence Ziring, op. cit .
. p. 24 .
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While the Constitutional Commission went along with
the idea of a presidential system, the legislative institu-
tion again would be dominant. The Commission was opposed
to the banning of politioal parties and the continuanoe of
Martial Law. 3° To the President such recommendations implied
the loss of the revolution and a reversal to the older
pattern of government with all its latent conflicts. It was
in this light that the Commission's report was eventually
rejected.
The Consitution, as finally announced, had the stamp
of Ayub s political views and his experience gained during
the martial law period. It included most of the features
of the memorandum presented by him in 1954.^^
Ayub stated:
My own analysis led me to the conclusion thatPakistan needed a strong government capable oftaking decisions which might not be popular but
which are necessary for the safety, integrity andin particualr
, development of the country. We
could not afford the luxury of a system which
would make the existence of the government sub-
servient to the whims and operations of pressure
groups
. On this part
,
I was not prepared to
make any compromise. 32
30Report of The Constitutional Commission, op. cit
., p. 78.
31See "A ^ short Appreciation of Present and Future Problems
of Pakistan" (Memorandum written by General Muhammed Ayub
Khan, Defense Minister, October 4
, 1954 ), reproduced in
KarlVon Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, op. cit.,
pp. 299-306, and in Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and
Politics in Pakistan , op. cit
.
,
pp. 2 ? 7 -30^
86
Ayub was convinced that the future of the nation
rested on mobilizing the rural people and the Basic
Democracies scheme was the only device ready at hand. At
the same time he was not oblivious to the reactions of the
sophisticated urban elite and its following, m his
Constitution speech of March 1, 1962, he said:
— '-SK s Si™
The President could not be dissuaded from the view that the
country required political stability and continuity of
leadership before anything else. He respected the par-
liamentary system but did not believe that Pakistanis
could afford another try at it, while the preconditions
for its constructive employment were missing, in their
absence, the parliamentary system meant a return to older
conflicts
.
32
33
See Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters-A Political
^tobiography
, Oxford University Press, I967, p. 213.
The Constitution; Th e President's Address t o the Nation,Government of Pakistan, The Bureau of National
Reconstruction (Karachi: I962), p. 12.
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Thus, the 1962 Constitution was an attempt to
institutionalize one-man rule through a strong Presidential
form of government. In Ayub
' s words
i
oustoSan'^nf *he final
and sho^Sd°b"e^ab!^ tSS^7;igh1‘^Sth ithe provinces and the centre ?hn., fa ° “
Pr:siSnf" i? cerulL!\r?;if-
we shall discuss the nature of the political system under
the 1962 Constitution in the following chapter.
3 '*
See "A Short Appreciation of Present
of Pakistan," op. pit ..
and Future Problems
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CHAPTER V
THE MILITARY AND POLITICS
PHASE II
The end of direct military-rule and the return of the
armed forces to their barracks does not mean that the
military will revert to the pre-coup position in relation
to politics. Once the armed forces enter the political
field, it becomes difficult for them to dissociate them-
selves from politics. An assertion and promise of returning
the country to civilian rule as soon as possible does not
mean that they will abandon interest in politics. First,
upon experiencing and exercising power, they desire to keep
it. Secondly, after introducing changes in the political,
social, and economic structure of the society, they do not
want those changes abandoned, and instead want to see their
objectives achieved. Thirdly, they acquire confidence
that they can handle the affairs of state better than their
predecessors whose inability to run civil government brought
them to power. Therefore, in preparing a framework of
political action for the post-military rule period, they
carefully devise a plan which will not take away their
benefits of exercising political authority, and undo
their reforms.
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The military leaders continue to play an Important
role in the political field after constitutional life ie
restored. They may establish a puppet civilian government
and control the levers of power from the background. Here
ultrmate power rests with the generals. Or they may let
the political leaders run the civil government and watch
politics carefully, keeping the possibility of their re-
entry open. They may press the government to take or not
take any particular step. Also the general who leads the
coup may resign military rank and run the government as a
civilian. This changes the nature of rule from the military
to civil but the real decision-making power still rests
with the new leader (who resigned from the military), the
bureaucracy and the serving generals. Their goal is to
run the administration effeolently and keep their en-
trenched position safe from encroachment by those who do
not agree with them.
The 1962 Constitution made it clear that the military
leaders, who led the 1958 coup in Pakistan, wanted to
retain their privileged position. Military rule under
Martial Law was brought to an end but the political power
remained concentrated in the hands of Ayub Khan.
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^
The martial law period (October 1958
-Maroh 1962) „as a
period of unchecked executive rule by President Ayub Khan.
ing this period, the central government attempted to
dxscourage anything approaching parliamentary politics and
succeeded in encouraging certain participants in overt
political decision-making-the newly emerging industrialist
class, military turned-civilian politicians, and the rural
based Basic Democrats. Ayub also continued to rely on the
Civil Service as an instrument of the viceregal, colonial-
Style regime he inherited and encouraged.^
In the words of one scholar, "the Constitution of
1962 established a constitutional autocracy."^ The
Constitution introduced the Presidential system of govern-
ment which gave almost all authority to the President,
making him virtually a constitutional dictator. He appointed
ministers and governors and enjoyed extensive authority in
legislative, financial, and administrative matters. He
was supreme commander of the armed forces, and he appointed
the Attorney-General, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
Chief Election Commissioner, and other important officials
Robert LaPorte, Power and Privilege; Influence and
Decision-Making in Pakistan
,
op. cit .. p. 56 .
2
Khalid Bin Sayeed, op. cit
.
,
Chapter 5 .
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who were traditionally kept independent of executive
authority. The judiciary's power to rule on the legality
of law passed by the legislature was limited. Decision-
making was an exclusive function of the President and his
chosen advisors. Provincial autonomy was reduced dras-
tically. While stressing centralization, the regime
recognized the people's need for a sense of participation in
the system, but that of a controlled participation. Urban
areas were disenfranchised and the rural areas were mobili-
zed as a counteirweight
.
After the I962 Constitution was introduced, the regime
was obliged to come to terms with the political elite and
include politicians in the cabinet. But even then, none
of the important cabinet portfolios--Defense
, Planning,
Finance, Home, —were given to politicians. Ayub's key
advisors throughout his rule remained non-political.
The change in power structure brought about by the
coup--especially the loss of power of the political elite--
meant that the East Pakistanis (the Bengalis, who formed
the largest ethnic group, of the population) had in-
sufficient representation. Even after years of a quota
system Bengali representation in the higher Civil Services
remained less than 40 percent. As late as I966, Bengalis
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constituted less than 30 percent of the Class I officers of
the Central Secretariat . ^ In the military elite, as I
emphasized this point elsewhere, Bengali representation was
as poor during the Ayub decade as during the previous era.
While Bengali representation in the entrepreneurial
class increased during the decade, none of the top twenty
or thirty families (who controlled of industrial profits,
of the insurance funds, and 80% of the banks), who
benefitted most from Ayub's economic policies, were Bengali.
Clearly, the Bengalis were marginally represented in the
policy-making and political support groups during the Ayub
period. Their nonrepresentation in the elite in an elitist
system deepened their sense of alienation. It pointed out
that the regime needed to devise policies and institutions
which would give the Bengalis a sense of participation in
and identification with the system.^
The landed aristocracy was another group that lost some
of its power under the Ayub regime. Before 1958, it was a
dominant interest group, owning not only villages but also
the votes within them. After the coup with the abolition
3
See Rounaq Jahan, op. cit
.
,
p. 6 I.
4
Ibid
.
,
p. 62 .
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old electoral process, the landlords control of the
rural vote lessened and so did their influence. The
rising Zaminders the owiers of large farms, replaced the
landed aristocrats, as the dominant interest group during
the decade.
During this period, the retired military officers
emerged as the class to occupy top posts of public and
private enterprises. The military became a ladder for
respectable jobs in the society. A number of retired
Lieutenant-Generals, Major-Generals and Brigadiers, and
equivalent ranks in the other services, were provided with
top positions in Government and semi-govemmental companies,
autonomous bodies and boards. These appointments also kept
them loyal to the regime. -5 The military were more the
support base of the regime, rather than actual participants
in public policy-making, which was left to the civil
bureaucracy
,
The entrepreneurial elite emerged as a powerful interest
group before 1958, and also made significant gains under the
Ayub regime. The regime's policy of economic development
through private enterprise helped consolidate the power
of this group. The participation and influence of these
^Ibid .
,
p. 62 .
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industrial entrepreneurs in the policy-making process was
informal and covert, but they did achieve economic and
fiscal policies which were advantageous to their interests,
as we shall discuss in a subsequent chapter. Their growing
ascendancy was also reflected in their increased representa-
tion in the national and provincial assemblies. Nearly
32 percent of the East Pakistani members and I9 percent of
the West Pakistani members of the national and provincial
assemblies of I962 and I965 were businessmen, industrialists,
and contractors.
From the foregoing discussion, we see that Ayub
drew his support first and foremost from the military, then
from the civilian bureaucracy, the new industrial/entre-
preneurial class and part of the traditional rural elite
(large landowners in West Pakistan and the middle-class,
Basic Democrats in East Pakistan)
. . His opponents included
the legal profession, former parliamentarians and other
politicians, university students and most of the intellectual
community, some large landowners in West Pakistan, a few
religious leaders, the urban middle-class in both wings, and
the urban and rural proletariat.
See Rounaq Jahan, op . cit
.
,
p. 60.
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Those who sought the restoration of democracy were
mainly led hy the urban intellectuals. They argued that theAyub regime was fundamentally un-democratic and dictatorial
nd demanded the introduction of the parliamentary system,
drastic reduction of the powers of the President, direct
ons instead of Basic Democracy, which they charged
was vulnerable to official pressures, constitutional free-
doms and rights, and removal of all restrictive controls
on political activities and on the press.
^
With increased pressure he gave in on some issues.
One issue was, the reintroduotion of political parties.
Political parties were legalized in July 1962. They were
not deliberately planned as were the Basic Democrats and the
Constitution. They were reintroduced with reluctance and
with certain limitarions. They were to be founded on
Islamic Ideology, and the disqualified politicians under
the EBDO and dismissed government officials were excluded
from participation. Soon a party system developed in the
country and opposition emerged.
Ayub was not ready to join any existing party or start
a new one. He assumed the role of supra-party leader and
left his supporters to organize a party for him. Instead
Singhal, op. cit . . p. 100.
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of building a party from the bottom up as Ayub suggested,
they decided to take over an already existing party. Their
choice was the Muslim League and they managed to capture a
section of the Muslim League in the party convention of
September I962.
The first Presidential elections under the I962
Constitution were held in January I965. They were pre-
ceeded by the elections of the Basic Democrats during
October and November 1964. The I965 election evoked
tremendous enthusiam in the country.
The opposition parties were divided in their ideology
and program f and no candidate could be found from among
the party leaders who was acceptable to all parties in both
regions of the country. On July 21, 1964, the opposition
political parties formed an electoral alliance, called the
Combined Opposition Parties (COP),® and put forth Miss
Fatima Jinnah, sister of the founder of the state, as their
The COP included: Awami League, National Awami Party,
Jamat-i-Islami
,
Nizam-i-Islam Party and Council Muslim
League. It was also supported by the National Democratic
Front (NDF) which was a loose alliance of opposition
elements numering fifty-two who were major political
leaders of East Pakistan, and prominent politicians from
the West wing.
9 ?
Presidential candidate. The OOP's election manifesto was
a nine point program, which featured the restoration of
parliamentary system of government with direct election
and universal adult franchise, and a promise to democratize
the 1962 Constitution. The issue dividing the two camps
was stability versus democracy. To Ayub the alternative
to his regime was chaos i to his opponents his regime was a
dictatorship and they sought democracy.
The results of the election showed that the Basic
Democrats aligned with the Ayub regime giving him a mandate
for the next five years. (Table V indicates the number of
votes cast for the two major candidates) The results of
the elections to the National Assembly showed that the
(Convention) Muslim League won an over-whelming majority
in the elections. (Table VI indicates the final party
positions in the I965 elections)
The Basic Democrats preferred Ayub to Jinnah, who, in
her pledges to restore democracy, created the impression that
under the system of adult franchise the Basic Democracies
would be scrapped, and would lose their importance, fund-
ing and attention they they received under Ayub. It was
not merely bureaucratic influence which won support for
Ayub. It has been suggested that he was able to persuade
the East Pakistani voters that their interests were looked
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after better under his regime than under his predecessors
.
9
But by casting their votes for the opposition candidates,
some East Pakistani voters demonstrated that they wanted
spokesmen in the assemblies who would put across their view-
points and interests.
Since the I965 National Assembly was completely domina
ted by the ruling party the opposition members had little
hope of effectively challenging the regime. Also the West
Pakistani component of the opposition was smaller that it
was before and this gave the opposition in the National
Assembly a regional aspect,
Two important problems of internal affairs faced the
newly constituted government of Pakistan. The first was
the expanding demand for full restoration of democracy; the
second was the growing alienation of East Pakistan from the
West
.
As mentioned earlier East Pakistani participation in
the political system established under Ayub's constitution
was limited. Also, because many of the leading political
leaders of East Pakistan were either disqualified under EBDO
or imprisoned, they couldn't participate in the system at
Khalid Bin Sayeed, op . cit
.
,
p. II3.
Rounaq Jahan, op. cit
.
,
p. 156.
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TABLE V
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (I965)
RESULT
C andidate Votes Polled Total io of
votes
polledE. Pakistan W. Pakistan
F.M. Ayub
Khan 21,012 28,939 49,951 63.31
Miss
Fatima
Jinnah
18,434 10,257 28,691 36.36
Source: Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics
In Pakistan
,
Lahore; Progressive Publishers,
197 ^^, p. 152.
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TABLE VI
PARTY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
Political Party
Seats Won
TotalE. Pakistan W. Pakistan
Pakistan Muslim
League
(Convention)
55 69 124
The C .0 .P. 14 1 15
Independent 9 8 17
Total 78 78 156
Source: Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics
In Pakistan, Lahore: Progressive Publishers,
1974, p. 153.
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Political movements in East Pakistan changed from
movements for competitive participation in the national
system to radical provincial autonomy movements. In this
period Bengali demands for autonomy became more radical and
polarization between the left and the right grew. Political
movments in the East wing took on a regional aspect. One
observer suggests that, the actual workings of the center-
province relationship under the 1962 constitution, and the
war with India contributed toward exacerbating Bengali
isolation and frustration.^^
Relations between East and West Pakistan continued to
deteriorate creating a sense of insecurity in the country.
During the Indo-Pakistan war in September I965, East
Pakistan was cut off from the west and left almost defense-
less. The break in communication between the two wings, and
East Pakistan's actual physical isolation, left it with a
deep sense of insecurity. "The war exposed more than ever
some of the practical disadvantages of the regime's centra-
lization policy. Left only with one army division, and
limited military supplies the Bengalis realized that East
Pakistan wouldn't be able to defend itself in the event of
12
Ibid
.
,
p. 159.
13 .
-^Singhal, op. cit
.
.
p.l 04 .
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foreign agression. They also resented the fact that they
were exposed to the danger of Indian occupation for the sake
of Kashmir. They also realized the economic difficulties
involved in depending too much on the center, with this the
East P-Ji^^anis now doubted the relaibility of West Pakistan"This led Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the
Awami League, to put forward his six-point program in
February 1966 for East Pakistan's regional autonomy.
The Awami Leagues' Six Points were:
1) The character of the Government shall be federal and
parliamentary, in which the election to the Federal
Legislature and to the legislatures of the federa-
ting units shall be direct and on the basis of univ-
ersal adult franchise. The representation in the
federal legislature shall be on the basis of
population.
2) The Federal Government shall be responsible only
for defense and foreign affairs and subject to the
conditions provided in (3) below, currency.
3) There shall be two seperate currencies mutually or
freely convertible in each wing for each region, or
Ik
Ihid
.
,
p. 104.
15 _
^Golam_W. Choudhury
,
^
The Last Days of United Pakistan .
Bloomington: Indiania University Press, 1974
,
p^! 22 .
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4 )
in the alternative a single currency, subject to the
establishment of a federal reserve system in which
there will be regional federal reserve banks which
will devise measures to prevent the transfer of
resources and flight of capital from one region to
another.
Fiscal policy shall be the responsibility of the
federating units. The federal government shall be
provided with requisite revenue resources for meeting
the requirements of defense- and foreign affairs, which
revenue resources would be automatically appropriable
the basis of the ratio to be determined by the pro-
cedure laid down in the Constitution. Such constitu-
tional provisions would ensure that Federal Govern-
ments revenue requirements are met consistently with
the objective of ensuring control over the fiscal
policy by the Governments of the federating units.
5) Constitutional provisions shall be made to enable
seperate accounts to be maintained of the foreign
exchange earnings of each of the federating units.
The foreign exchange requirmenets of the Federal
Government shall be met by the governments of the
federating units on the basis of a ration to be
104
determined in accordance with the procedure laid
down in the Constitution. The regional governments
shall have power under the Constitution to negotiate
foreign trade and aid within the framework of the
foreign policy of the country, which shall be the
responsibility of the Federal Government.
6) The Government of the federating units shall be
empowered to maintain militia or para-military
force in order to contribute effectively towards
1 6
national security.
The regime adopted a policy of total opposition toward
the six-points movement. This gave the movement a kind of
martydom. Ayub regarded the program as designed to break
up the country's unity, and reacted sharply. Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman was arrested under the emergency regulations
on May 9 * This caused violent demonstrations in East
Pakistan. At Dacca and elsewhere, supporters of the Awami
League clashed with the police, and several people were
17killed and injured.
1 f)
^^Extract from Awami League Manifesto . Quoted in Rushbrook
L. Williams, The East Pakistan Trajedy , London: Tom
Stacey, 1972, Appendix 2, pp. 117-118
.
^'^See D. Singhal, op. cit . , p. 104
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Discontent against Ayub and the movement for democracy
was reinforced in I967. The ban on the politicians, dis-
allowing them from taking part in political life under the
Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order of 1959, expired
at the end of 1966. Long debarred from active politics,
these politicians entered the arena with vigor and resent-
merit against Ayub.
Five opposition parties: the Awami League (Nasrullah
group), the Muslim League (Council), the Jamaat-i-islami
,
the Nizam-i-Islam, and the National Democratic Front-
formed a united front, the Pakistan Democratic Movement
(PDM), in May 1967.^® The PDM adopted an eight-point
formula which proposed greater autonomy than that provided
for by the 1956 Consitution but less than that demanded in
the Awami League's six-points. In general, the six-point
program attempted to take power away from the center, while
the PDM's program concentrated on devising equal partici-
pation at the center.
Unrest in the country continued to spread. Strikes in
railways and jute mills, involving thousands of workers
18
The PDM did not accept the six-point program of the
Awami League for regional autonomy. Hence the Awami
League under acting President Nazrul Islam refused tojoin the PDM. However a small group under Nasrullah
Split with the Awami League and joined the PDM. The
National Awami Party led by Maulana Bhashani did not
join.
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became frequent. In 196?, the National Awami Party
actively campaigned for the breakup of West Pakistan into
separate units. The government took repressive measures,
prohibiting meetings and processions. This raised further
suspicion that the President intended to suppress political
activity.
In 1968, Ayub aggravated the feeling of the oppositon
further by celebrating the tenth anniversary of his regime
as the Decade of Reforms. The government propaganda
machinery told the people how much better off they were, which
caused further resentment?®
The government alienated the opposition further by
announcing the discovery of an anti-national plot in East
Pakistan, which became known as the Agartala Conspiracy
21Case. The regime thought that a public trial would
terrorize the radical autonomists into silence and would
win over the mass of the people, but the exact opposite
happened, and the accused were made heroes.
Tq '
~
Lawrence Ziring, op. cit
.
,
p. 98 .
^^
Ibid
.
,
p. 89 .
21The_Argatala Conspiracy Case, charged thirty-three East
Pakistani politicians, civil servants, and army men with
conspiring to bring about East Pakistan's secession from
the center in collusion with India. The list of alleged
conspirators included three high-ranking East Pakistani
civil servants and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
10 ?
^iscon'tsn.'t s-gs-insls Ayub fX^irGd. up in"to s. 1113.3017
political crisis by November I968 , in October, students
in West Pakistan launched an agitation demanding educational
reforms. Their demonstrations coincided with the Decade of
Development celebrations. Thousands of persons, including
prominent leaders of the opposition, such as Bhutto, Khan
Abdul Wall Khan, and Maulana Bhashani
,
were arrested. The
intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie also took an active part.^^
When disaffection spread to the military circles, the
situation became critical. Air Marshal (retired) Asghar
Khan announced his decision to enter politics to work for
a more liberal regime. He gained popularity in speaking out
against the regime.
On December 7 the National Awami Party called a
general strike in Dacca. Two persons were killed and twenty
injured as a result of firing by the police. The opposition
parties in protest called a general strike throughout East
Pakistan on December 14, which brought life in Dacca to a
standstill. After this uprising, agitation in East Pakistan
24gained its own momentum and distinct character.
or>
“Singhal, op. cit .
,
p. 108.
28
Rizvi, op. cit .
,
p. 199'
^^Ibid.
,
p. 200.
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In this situation, the leaders of eight opposition
parties met in Dacca on January 8, 1969, and formed the
Democratic Action Committee to provide a united leadership
to the mass movement?^ The D.A.C. decided not to participate
in upcoming elections and demanded; freedom of the press,
full autonomy for East Pakistan, the restoration of democracy
based on direct elections and adult franchise, the nation-
alization of banks, insurance companies, and large-scale
industries, the immediate termination of the emergency
regulations which prevented detention with trial, and the
institution of an independent foreign policy.
After street rioting continued for over four months in
both wings of the country, Ayub offered to hold talks in a
Round Table Conference with responsible political parties
of the opposition to discuss constitutional changes and a
solution to the political crisis. Bhutto and Bhashani re-
fused to participate in the conference. The DAC was willing
to talk provided emergency rule was revoked and all
political prisoners, including Sheikh Mu jib and Bhutto
were released. Ayub acceded to the demands.
26
The eight parties were: the six-point Awami League, the
National Awami Party (Requistionists ) , Jamiat-ul-ulema-
i-Islam, Nizam-i-Islam, the National Democratic Front,
the Awami League (Nasrullah)
,
the Muslim League (Council),
and Jamaat-i-Islami
. Bhashani ' s National Awami Party and
Bhutto's PPP were not included.
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The Round Table Conference took place on March
10
. Nasrullah Khan, put forward the two points upon which
there was agreement among the eight opposition parties-
a federal parliamentary system of government with regional
autonomy, and the election of legislatures by direct adult
franchise. In addition to more autonomy for East Pakistan,
Mujibur Rahman, wanted a dominant position at the center.
He also urged the division of Mest Pakistan into the former
provinces of Sind, the Punjab, the Northwest Frontier, and
Baluchistan. The regime was willing to concede parliamentary
government, direct elections, and federalism, but rejected
the regional autonomy demands, which were the essence of the
movement in East Pakistan. The PDM members of the D.A.c.
supported the regime on this, but the Awami League and the
pro-moscow National Awami Party insisted on full regional
autonomy.
The Round Table Conference became deadlocked and
failed to reach any agreement. On March 13, Ayub announced
his own formula which included, restoration of the parlia-
mentary and federal system and a direct method of elections.
He wanted to restore the status quo as it had existed before
27
the coup of 1958.
27Golam Choudhury, op. cit
.
, p. 39.
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After the talks on political settlement failed, there
occured an almost complete breakdo™ of governmental
machinery, and conditions in the country became semi-
anarchic. In the meantime, changes in the power and
political relationships between Ayub and his support
coalition had worsened.
By the fall of 1968, Ayub could no longer depend on
the unified, solid support of the military. The erosion of
this support was one of the major reasons behind his
announcement to retire. Resentment against him in the
military started with the Tashkent Declaration and continued
to grow. When the regime faced the serious political
crisis of 1968-69, the military dissociated itself from
Ayub.
A major indication of the military’s disenchatment
with Ayub was seen in the emergence of Asghar Khan and a
few other retired Generals who became vocal opponents of
the regime. It is unlikely that he entered politics in
opposition to Ayub without some indication, that a segment
of the military agreed with and supported his activities.
The military was also disasstisfied with Ayub's decision
to withdraw the Agartala Conspiracy Case, which then put
them in an embarassing position.
2 g ^
—
Rizvi, op. cit
.
,
p. 212 .
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After Ayub announced his decision not to seek re-
election, neither the military nor the bureaucracy were
willing to go out of the way to support him. The I 968-69
violence in the streets and Ayub's reaction to it reflected
his precarious standing vis-a-vis the military. Facing all
the realities. Ayub retired from the Presidency on March 25 ,
1969 and appointed General Yahya Khan as Chief Martial Law
Administrator. Yahya abrogated the 1962 Constitution,
banned all political activity (not parties), dissolved the
National and Provincial assemblies, dismissed the central and
provincial cabinets and declared Martial Law throughout the
country. On March 31, Yahya assumed the Presidency
.
In his farewell broadcast", Ayub presented the same
dismal picture of the country as he had done when the army
coup took place on October 7, 1958. Then, Ayub justified
the army's take-over on grounds of what he termed "total
administrative, economic, political and moral chaos in the
country." After eleven years of almost absolute rule, he
confessed that the country was on the verge of total
collapse and declared: "I cannot preside over the destruc-
tion of my country.
29See D. Singhal, op. cit., p. 114.
30Dawn
,
(Karachi), October 9, 1958.
31See Ayub's last broadcast on March 25» 1969» in Dawn,
March 26, I 969 .
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The political system introduced by Ayub Khan,
established an authoritarian system with guided democracy
in Pakistan, which ensured stability and continuity rather
than people's participation in the affairs of the state,
the country-wide revolt against the Ayub regime was a revolt
against injustloes suffered by the people and growing
economic disparity, which encouraged frustration and alien-
ation. The people's uprising also revealed the inadequate
development of political institutions in the decade. In
both wings the uprising was a spontaneous popular movement,
with little leadership from the political parties.
The parties and leaders joined the movement after it was
already a success, and therefore were in no position to
counter or guide the uprisings.
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CHAPTER VI
THE REGIME'S ATTEMPT AT NATION
-BUILDING
THROUGH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Economic growth during the Ayub years was outstanding
by quantitative measures. Macro-growth was about six
percent per year for the decade of the 1960 's. In
examining the data, one finds that from 1959-60 to
1966-67
, Pakistan averaged a yearly growth in GNP of about
5.17 percent. Compared with the eight-year period from
1950-51 to 1957 - 58 » in which the average increase was
2.19 percent per year, claims of quantitative economic
growth are justified. A look at another gross indicator,
per capita income, shows that there was no growth during
the years 1950-51 to 1957 - 58 i but there was a 20.1 percent
increase from 1959-60 to I966-67. Also important, during
the four years prior to 1957-58, population increase
equaled or surpassed the increase in GNP, while during
the Ayub period this did not occur. In short, a look at
the statistics, indicates that Pakistan was making
progress .
^
1Statistics reported in. Ministry of Finance, Pakistan
Economic Survey, I966-67
,
Karachi; Government of
Pakistan, 1967
. pp. 1-5
^Ibid.
11^
The gross measurements do not, however, tell the
Whole story, for the statistics emphasize only GNP growth.
A look at qualitative inequalities as reflected in income
distribution among social/economic classes more
accurately reveal actual pattern of redristribution.
Significant gains were made in all sectors, but little
advantage filtered down to poor urban and rural people.
The plight of the industrial worker was worse than that
of the average Pakistani.^
Wealth and economic power remained concentrated in the
few families drawn from the trading communities. The
chief economist of the Planning Commission, Dr. Mahbub-
ul-Haq, revealed at the I 968 convention of the Pakistan
Management Association that 66 percent of the entire
industrial capital of the country was concentrated in the
hands of twenty families who controlled 80 percent of the
banking and 97 percent of the insurance of the country.^
3
4
Lawrence Ziring, op. cit
.
. p. 88.
In addition, the twenty families had direct control of
the bulk of large-scale business and commerce activities
3-^d indirect control of a number of other concerns.
For additional information on these families, see
Gustav Papanek, Pakistan's Development; Social Goals&
IJ^centives
, Cambridge; Harvard University Press,
1967 ; Hanna Papanek, "Entrepreneurs in East Pakistan,"
in^Robert Beech, ed.
,
Bengal Society
, East Lansing;
Asian Studies Center, Michigan State University, 1971;
"Pakistan's New Industrialists and Businessmen; Focus on
the Memons , " unpublished paper, 1970.
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pie. This resulted in thp -rioVich becoming richer and the
poor poorer.
Despite impressive improvement in the economy.
Pakistan did not make a breakthrough in any sector. Self-
sufficiency in food production was yet to be achieved.
Rising trends in prices were not arrested, nor the
concentration of economic wealth into the hands of the
few. The problem of poverty still remained.
Economic disparity between the two wings of
Pakistan continued to Increase because much of the in-
vestment, especially private, was made in West Pakistan.
This was a major reason of East Pakistan's hatred for
West Pakistan--its long and deep sense of economic
oppression.
Although East Pakistan earned most of the country's
exchange, the economic benefits accrued to West Pakistan,
The bulk of foreign exchange earnings, as well as foreign
^See L. Ziring, op. cit
.
.
p. 88.
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aid and loans, were used to import machinery and raw
materials to strengthen West Pakistan's industrial complex.
Although both wings started from the same level in 1949-
50, the rate of industrial development was greater in
West Pakistan than in East Pakistan. This was possible
because East Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings were
utilized for the benefits of West Pakistan through import
controls and bank credit policies which favored West
Pakistan, investment of foreign aid and loans in the west
wing, and by utilizing the vast East Pakistan market for
the manufactured goods of West Pakistan.^ Between 194?
and 1967 Pakistan exported goods worth about Rs
.
36
billion and imported goods worth about Rs
.
50 billion. Of
these, the share of East Pakistan in export was about Rs
.
21 billion to West Pakistan's Rs. 15 billion; in imports,
about Rs. 15 billion to West Pakistan's 34 billion."^
Thus, West Pakistan exported much less than East Pakistan
but imported much more and there was a net transfer of
resources from East to West Pakistan through foreign, as
well as interwing trade. Between I96O-61 to I966-67,
Damodar P. Singhal, op. cit., p. 173.
7See Stephen R. Lewis, Pakistan; Industrialization and
Trade Politics
, pp. 142-43
.
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Of the $ltOO million of foreign aid received each year,
about two
-thirds of it went to West Pakistan.
The second Five-year Plan, acknowledged awareness
of the economic disparity, but it did not make any
commitment to remove it. The plan aimed at spending
Rs. 13,500 million in West Pakistan against Rs. 9,500
million in East Pakistan. Forty-seven percent of
Pakistan's total public sector expenditure and thirty
percent of the private sector's were planned for East
Pakistan, but the result was that only thirty-two percent
of the total expenditure of both the sectors was spent.
During this period the realized rate of growth was kA
in West Pakistan and 2.6 percent in East Pakistan."^
Under pressure from East Pakistan, the principle of
regional parity was instituted in Pakistani politics and
economy. The regime adopted a series of economic steps
designed to improve the East wings
' s economy. In December
1961, the National Finance Commission was established to
recommend redistribution of resources between the
center and the provinces. In J -.nuary I962, the Pakistan
Industrial Development Corporation (PDIC) was bifurcated,
followed by bifurcation of the railways.®
"^Ibid.
,
p. 175
g
Jahan, op . cit
.
,
p. 68.
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the total value of foreign exchange earned by East
Pakistan was Rs. 9 .O 6 I million and the foreign exchange
spent on them for importing capital goods and industrial
materials was Rs . 8,683 million--Rs. 378 million less
than it earned. During the same period West Pakistan
earned Rs.7,426 million in foreign exchange and received
imports costing Rs. 20,268 million; Rs
. 12,840 million
more than what it earned. The excess expenditure was met
from the balance of East Pakistan's share and foreign
grants, aid, and loans. This was an example of the
consequence of the government's centralized management of
the economy of Pakistan.-^ The government failed to
provide the same facilities for the development of large-
scale industries in East Pakistan as it did in West
Pakistan. This resulted in the structure of East
Pakistan's economy in the 1960's remaining about the same
as it was during 1949 - 50 . While the share of large-
scale manufacturing industries in Gross National Product
(GNP ) increased in West Pakistan over a twenty-three year
period, that of East Pakistan did not increase to any
6
significant extent.
^See Muzaffar Ahmed Choudhury, "Measures of Disparity,"
Forum
, 30 January, 1971
»
p. 11.
See D. Singhal, op . cit
.
,
p. 174.
119
In March 1962, the new constitution was introduced which
declared the removal of economic disparity a constitutional
Obligation. According to article 145 ( 4 ) of the
constitution:
formulating the plans..s all be to ensure that disparities between* theprovinces,^ and between different arearwithin aProvince, in relation to income per capita, areremoved, and that the resources of Pakistanare used and allocated in such a wa^af^r*
* *
achieve that object in the shortest possible time.
But the constitution fell short, by continuing to grant
most of the elastic sources of revenue to the center.
The third Five-yean Plan allocated 53 percent of the public
sector expenditure and 50 percent of the private sector
expenditure to East Pakistan, but again the major sources
of revenue were granted to the center. In actual
performance only 36 percent of all Pakistan's total, both
sectors were spent for East Pakistan.
Consequently, West Pakistan was well ahead of East
Pakistan in economic development, and the gulf widened.
By June I968 the gap between the per capita incomes of
the East and West wings had increased greatly. In I96O-
1961, West Pakistan's per capita income was 31 percent
higher than that of East Pakistan. By the end of the
9 •Pakistan, Ministry of Law, The Constitution of The
Republic of Pakistan
.
I962, p.?6.
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decade in 1969-70 the gulf widened to 61 percent.
The continuation of disparity led to demands for
alternative strategies of economic development. An
example of this was seen in the two-economy thesis. The
two-economy theorists suggessted that as Pakistan was
"geographically two countries", there should be two
distinct economies. The^e ^-i-in economists argued that the
economic union of the two wines wap ofg s no purpose because
benefits of development in one wing could not be
shared by the other and the surplus labor force in one
area could not migrate to the other. They sought complete
control over their own foreign exchange earnings and
trade, and asked for separate taxes, tarrifs, and in-
dustrial policy.
Measures to combat the disparity and promises to
increase East Pakistan's share of public sector develop-
ment failed to mollify the East Pakistanis and to convince
them of the government's sincerity, it led the Bengalis
of East Pakistan to discredit the regime.
lOJahan, op. cit
.
.
p. 8l.
11 Ibid
.
,
p. 85
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Attempts to institute land reform in West Pakistan
were not very successful, mainly because there was a
large concentration of lando^ership in a few persons who
wielded great political power and influence. In West
Pakistan nearly one-third of the total area was held by
owners who each possessed one-hundred acres or more, half
of these owned more than five-hundred acres. About six
thousand persons owned land to the extent of five-hundred
acres or more; they held about 7.5 million acres of land
among them. Overall average land-holding was twelve acres^^
East Pakistan was ahead of West Pakistan in the field
of land reform. There most of the big landlords were
Hindus, who migrated to India. After their migration a
land reform was carried out. The Acquisition and Tenancy
Act was passed which abolished all rent receiving interests
between the tenants and the state.
The problem of land distribution and tenure was
attended to with the establishment of the Land Reform
Commission on October I 9 , 1958. According to the reforms
no landlord could own more than five-hundred acres of
irrigated or 1,000 acres of unirrigated land, and one-
12See D. Singhal, op. cit
.
,
p. 126.
1
3
^See Hasan Askari Rizvi, op. cit.
, p. 124.
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hundred and fifty acres of orchard. Landlords were to
receive substantial compensation for land surrendered
in the form of government bonds. Many large land
holders, anticipated reform and decreed land to relatives,
thereby avoiding the ceiling on their landholding.
The land that became available for redistribution was far
below expected; only 2.2 million acres to be distributed
among 150,000 tenants; 6.4 million acres were retained by
6,000 landlords.
Thus, the reforms offered only mild remedies to tackle
the major problems involved. Some of the more archaic,
feudal aspects of landlord-peasant relationships were
abolished, but there occured no large-scale land ex-
propriation and redistribution. Few large landowners lost
land. However, the landlords who did sell portions of
their holdings enabled middle-sized farmers with available
funds to purchase land. The Third Five-year Plan, I965-70
emphasized the development of middle and upper middle-
class farmers, while reassuring the status of the already
powerful landowners. This gradual modernization from
above approach to agricultural development illustrated
Khalid Bin Sayeed, op. cit
.
,
p.9?.
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the conservative character of Ayub's land reform. Social
change in terms of land tenure revisions and redistribution
was practically nonexistent under Ayub.^^
The regime also gave attention to improving the
position of women in Pakistani society and to protecting
children from exploitation within the family. The
result was the enactment of the Muslim Family Laws
Ordinance of I 96 I. it discouraged the practice of
polygamy, promoted women's rights, and was regarded as
the first step tov/ards modernization of family life.
The new law represented the growing influence of modern
ideas in the social consciousness of Pakistan.
In a third area, education, the Ayub regime was most
unsuccessful. If the literarcy rate is used as a measure,
the Ayub regime barely kept up with the population
increase. The goal of universal education was not
achieved. Disparity in education between the two wings
existed. East Pakistan claimed that the central government
15The third Five-year Plan emphasized tube-well construc-
tion, use of fertilizers, use of improved "miracle seeds",
and other technical input solutions c This approach did
not consider redistribution of land or other social
justice criteria. See planning Commission, The Third
Five Year Plan, 1965-70
, Karachi: Government of
Pakistan, 19^5'
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made no serious efforts to remove disparities. A look
at enrollment indicates that the disparity existed in the
enrollment of students at various levels, in the number of
educational institutions, in the number of staff and staff-
student ration, and in expenditure.^^ Development of the
education sector in West Pakistan far outstripped East
Pakistan's grov/th during this period. Enrollment in
primary schools increased by 1,153 in East Pakistan and
by 16,412 in West Pakistan. The increase in secondary
school, college and university enrollment was 419,001,
81,103, and 5i065, respectively, for East Pakistan, and
by 588, 711 » 167820, and I4,6l6, respectively for VJest
17Pakistan. '
Thus in the above three areas of social change--
land distribution and socio-economic relations, family and
social relationships, and education-
-planning reflected a
preference for preserving and extending elite privileges.
Changes that did occur were gradual and minor, and did
not antagonize the middle-class coalition that supported
Ayub.
17See Dr. Abu Obaidul Haque
,
"Educational Disparity in
Pakistan," Forum, 20 December, I969.
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chapter VII
THE YAHYA REGIME
After the collapse of the Ayub regime, Yahya Khan,
then oommander-in-ohief of the Pakistani army, „as brought
to power by the ruling elite of the civil-military
bureaucracy. The second martial law of March I969 was
very much a defensive maneuver on the part of the ruling
elite to maintain its position, which had been threatened
hy the mass movements of I968-69. The task of the Yahya
regime, therefore, was to seek a new political order which
could maintain the status quo, although granting con-
cessions to the counter elite. Here an attempt will be
made to discuss briefly the policies of the post-Ayub
period and their impact on the eventual disintegration of
Pakistan.
The new martial law authorities did not find any
great difficulty in controlling the situation and restor-
ing law and order. Conditions in West Pakistan improved
but in East Pakistan they never fully came under the
control of the administration.
In spite of parallels with 1958 » certain things
distinguished the circumstances of Yahya 's martial law.
The situation inherited by him was much worse than on the
126
eve Of the partial law in 1958. The
.ood in the country
was not that of 1958. when, sioh of the political leaders,
people welcomed martial law. Now the political leaders
had re-emerged on the political scene and succeeded in
building public support for themselves. The five months
of rebellion against the Ayub regime had produced total
chaos. The atmosphere was charged with left-right con-
frontation, regional emotionalism and other political
issues. There was a strong movement for maximum autonomy
in East Pakistan.
The policies pursued by the Yahya regime differed
from those of Ayub. After the mass movements of 1968-69
it became obvious to the ruling elite that some of the
demands of the more vocal groups in the mass movement
would have to be met. Yahya therefore adopted a number
of conciliatory policies specificially designed to
placate the groups that spearheaded the mass movement.
New education and wage policies were announced to meet
the demands of students and labor, and the payscale of
salarisd professionals was improved.^
1
Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan Failure in National Integration.
op. cit
.
. p. 186 ^ —
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Unlike Ayub, „ho disdained politicians and wanted to
stay above politics, Yahya recognized the necessity of
both politics and politicians, and decided to play the
role of arbitrator among conflicting groups. Unlike Ayub,
he did not ban political parties, nor did he adopt re-
strictive political measures like EBDO or the arrest of
opposition leaders. He could not remain neutral, however,
the regime's policy was to maintain the fundamental interest
of the ruling elite through the roles of mediator and
ppower broker.
The transfer of power from Ayub to Yahya did not
shift political power from the hands of the military and
the bureaucracy. On the other hand, it provided another
opportunity to exercise political power without any
popular and. consbi'fcu'tional restrictions.
The regime's organization was such that civilian
functions were performed alongside military ones. Yahya
continued to be the Commander-in Chief of the army.
According to his own order of precedence, he described
himself first as Commander-in-Chief then Chief Martial
Law Administrator and lastly President. He retained his
post of Commander-in-Chief in the expectation that it
2 ;
Damodar P. Singhal, Pakistan
, New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
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would enable him to have direct
the General Headquarters (GHQ);
confidence of GHQ by becoming an
ceasing to be Commander-in-Chief
access to and links with
as Ayub had lost the
"elective" president and
3
Yahya Khan had limited, if any, experience of politics
He had been C-in-C since I 966 and was overshadowed by
Ayub Khan. When he assumed the office of President, his
Ideas about the future of Pakistan were not as clear as
were those of Ayub in 1958. One author described him as
"a man having no vision of a bold initiative."^
Within twenty-four hours of coming into power; in his
first nation-wide broadcast as head of the government
Yahya assured his countrymen that:
I wish to make it absolutely clear to you that
I have no ambition other than the creation of
conditions conducive to the establishment of a
constitutional government. It is my firstbelief that a sound, clean and honest adminis-
tration is
^
3- prerequisite for sane and construc-
tive political life and for the smooth transfer
of power to the elected representatives of the
people. It ^ will be the task of these elected
representatives to give the country a workable
constitutional and final solution to all other
political, economic and social problems that
have been agitating the minds of the people. 5
,Golam Choudhury, op. cit
.
,
p. 50 .
Golam Choudhury, "The Emergence of Bangladesh and the
South Asian Triange." Yearbook of World Affairs
.
London, 1973
» p. 75.
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The men immediately next to the President were
Lieutenant General Peerzada, as the Principal Staff
Officer (PSO), and General Abdul Hamid Khan, the Army
Chief of Staff. Access to the President was usually
through them. Other people around the President were
Lieutenant General Gul Hasan, Chief of the General Staff,
and Major General Ghulam Umar, Chief of National Security^
Major decisions were discussed and arrived at by them, in
a highly informal manner. Formal procedures were usually
by-passed. Under the PSO were two brigadiers given charge
of martial law affairs and civil affairs. These two were
the "super secretaries"; no secretary of any ministry
could send a file to the President without going through
these two, who were under the direct control and super-
vision of the PSO .
The various ministries were divided as follows:
Yahya was in charge of Defense and Foreign Affairs.
General Hamid, the Chief of Staff and number two in the
^See the text of Yahya 's broadcast on March 26, I969, in
Dam, March 27 » 1969 and also in Hasan Askari Rizvi,
The Military and Politics in Pakistan, op. cit.
, pp.
303-305.
Kenneth E. Bauzon, "Breakdom of A Military Regime:
The Case of Pakistan (1969-71)» Asia Quarterly
,
Vol. 2,
January 1977*
7Golam Choudhury, op. cit .
,
p. 50
.
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armed forces, took the home ministry. The rest was
divided between the two chiefs of the Air Force and the
Navy: Nur Khan, the Air Commander-in-chief, became the
overlord of the ministries of education, labor, health,
social welfare, while the navy chief, Ahsan, was given
finance, planning, industry and commerce. Yahya, Hamid,
Peerzada, Nur Khan, and Ahsan constituted a small
cabinet known as the council of administration.®
An analysis of the careers of the members of Yahya 's
cabinet appointed in August 1969. indicated that the
powerful combination of the civil and military elite, which
was the main cause of Ayub Khan’s failure, still shared
power with Yahya Khan.
Professor Golam Choudhury, who served as a
constitutional adviser and minister of communications in
Yahya s cabinet, had this to say concerning the role of
the cabinet:
Never in my two years as a member of the cabinet
i find any real and meaningful discussion on
vital ^ matt ers such as defense, foreign affairs,
administrative or political policies and programs.
The cabinet was a ceremonial body, its members often
touring as v.i.p. 's in the principal cities inaugura-
ting^ public functions, presiding over innocuous
meetings, etc. A cabinet minister's role in the
military regime depended primarily on his relation-
O
Ibid
.
,
p
.
51
.
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ship with the President, the Presidpnt'o
the minister's links with othlr^^fluentLr^^members of the ruling junta. ^^ ^ ntial
Fazal Muqueem Khan reports
;
The ministers were nominated, representpd no ov^o
President'on!y: “^rwlr^noriro^"best or most qualified men available?”'°Sfwever®It was not the men but the jobs that ^Nereimportant, any stooge could have done them, lo
The role of the bureaucrats, which reached its
zenith during the Ayub era, suffered a temporary eclipse.
Peerzada, the Principal Staff Officer remarked: "We took
the blame last time when everything was done by the
civilians. This time we will do everything and take the
credit too."^^ The new regime terminated the services of
three-hundred and three civil servants, including some top
CSP officers. There were few who believed that the mass
dismissal of senior civil servants would end corruption
in the civil services or that the rest of the officers
had never induldged in unfair and corrupt practices.
9Choudhury, op. cit., o.'^6.
10
Fazal Muqueem Khan, Pakistan's Crisis in Ledership
,
Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1973, p* 20.
^
^bid
.
, p. 19.
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Yahya Khan made it clear in the beginning that he
had taken over to enable the political leaders to evolve
a democratic framework. He reiterated that he would
arrange elections to the Constituent Assembly on the basis
of direct adult franchise.
lack of political insight and his inability to keep a
balance between the diverse political/economic/ social
and regional forces which threatened the political system,
plunged the country into a civil war. Instead of restoring
democratic institutions, he presided over the disinte-
gration of Pakistan.
Apart from complex political and constitutional
issues, Pakistan was beset with gargantuan problems in the
socio-economic sphere. The great debate on the synthesis
of economic growth and social and distributive justice
had already begun. The issue was whether such a synthesis
could be achieved without fundamental changes in the
political and economic order. Yahya's government being a
"temporary one", was neither capable nor willing to under-
take such revolutionary changes in the economic system.
The crucial questions were: first, would West Pakistan
12
See"General Yahya Khan's first news conference" , The
Guardian
,
April 11, I969.
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pay the economic and political price needed for the
viability of a united Pakistan? The bulk of the rupee
capital could come from only one source: west Pakistan.
And West Pakistan industrialists were also expected to
bear the burden of the new measures to correct social
inequities. As one foreign expert pointed out, the
prospects were not hopeful: "At best, East Pakistan
development will be painful. At worst, the task may be
completely impossible even with a monumental effort , "13
Secondly, would the Bengalis be prepared to wait for an
evolutionary process to remove the economic disparity by
"step-by-step concessions"? The political climate in
East Pakistan in 1970 was not indicative of any compromise
or waiting.
The National Economic Council met on June 2
,
I970,
to finalize the fourth five-year plan with the two
divergent reports from the East and West Pakistan
economists. The Planning Commission, in its final
assessment on the plan, pointed out to the National
Economic Council that to secure the widest possible
support in both wings of the country any pattern of
From a review paper by Dr. Ralph Smuckler, former
representative of the Ford Foundation in Pakistan,dated September I6, and 1?, I969.
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regional allocations must, in its judgement, fulfill at
least two important criteria;
3^? in East Pakistan than the combinedallocations for the four provinces of wls^PaSl^an.
^2. While ensuring maximum feasible accelp-ra + i n-nin East Pakistan, the allocation for West pSis?anmust nevertheless provide for a minimurnecSSrr
acceleration to permit a larger social program aM
w:srpLIslaS!®l4°" developed areas of
The fourth five-year plan (1970-75) was launched on
July 1
, 1970. It reflected the desire of the Government
to bring about wider distribution of economic development.
It proposed a development program of Rs. 7, 500 crore;
of this 4,900 crore was allocated to the public sector
and Rs. 2,600 crore to the private sector. (See Table
^*^ 1* the shares allocated to the two wings)
.
These estimates were reached before the outbreak of
the civil war in East Pakistan and the fourth five-year
plan very soon became the victim of the political crisis
which gripped Pakistan in I 97O- 7 I.
14
Choudhury, op. cit .
.
p.62.
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Yahya Khan believed 'that: before the resumption of
political activity there should be general agreement on
the fundamentals of political conduct and behavior and on
such basic questions as the degree of regional autonomy and
the basis upon which the two wings of Pakistan should be
represented in the national parliament. Divisions among
the political parties were many, ranging from ideology to
local issues. Even on the nature of constitutional
government, which they all sought, they seemed to be far
apart
.
There were three basic issues which Yahya had to
decide. The first was the Bengali demand for representa-
tion on the basis of "one man, one vote" in an unqualified
way and without any reservation such as a second parlia-
mentary chamber or a special voting procedure requiring
more than a simple majority in the national assembly.
The second and most complicated issue was the relation-
ship between the center and provinces; according to
Choudhury, "this was the crux of the whole constitutional
15
quest for a viable political order in Pakistan." The
third issue related to the breakup of "one unit" and the
restoration of the old provinces in West Pakistan.
__
Ibid
.
,
p . 82
.
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After extensive discussions with the leading
politicians of both wings, Yahya pointed out three issues
which would not be allowed to become election issues.
Firstly, the question of representation on the basis of
population or the existing mode of parity between the two
wings, secondly, the future of one unit in the West wing
and thirdly, the problem of autonomy for East Pakistan.
In his address to the nation on November 28
,
I969,
he declared the first two issues resolved. One unit was
to be dissolved^and the four provinces of West Pakistan
reconstituted. The democratic principle of one man one
vote was accepted and would form the basis of elections,
thus giving the Bengalis a majority in the assembly.
The most important issue for East Pakistan, that of
autonomy, was left open—for the people's representatives
to decide. In the same address he spelled out the time
table for the transfer of power to the elected represen-
tatives of the people. He announced that in October
1970, elections would be helf to elect members of the
1
6
Fazal Muqueem Khan, op. cit
. ,p. 33.
17The four provinces of West Pakistan, the Punjab, Sind,
Northwest Frontier Province, and Baluchistan started
functioning from July 1
,
I97O.
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National and Provincial assemblies, and that to
facilitate electioneering, free political activity would
be permi't'ted after January 1
,
1970.^^
Golam Choudhury posits that the whole plan was based
on three fundamental premises;
First, Mujib would modify his six point nlauand would be satisfied with genuinrp^ovinSll
secession! secondly, theWest Pakistani leaders, both the politicians ande ig industrialists, would be willing to makehe necessary sacrifices and concessions tosatisfy the legitimate aspirations, politicaldemands and economic dues of the Bengalis as a
condition for keeping Pakistan united; andthirdly, the military junta must give up thepower to which it had become accustomed since1958- 19
In conformity with this program, full political
activity was allowed in the country with effect from
January 1, I970. Three months later, the Legal
Framework Order (the L.F.O.) provided the guidelines for
the general elections and outlined the principles which
the military leaders thought the National Assembly must
keep in mind while framing the constitution. Besides
containing instructions about how the Assembly would
See President's Address to The Nation; General A.M .
Yahya Khan, President of Pakistan
. November 28
,
I969,
Published by the Dept, of Films and Publications,
Government of Pakistan, Karachi.
19Choudhury, op. cit
.
,
p. 89.
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come into being, its strength, rules of ^s x r procedures and
other related matters, it clearly defined some basic
principles of ocnsitution making. The L.P.o. provided
that the National Assembly must complete its task of
framing the constitution within one-hundred twenty days,
while the President reserved the right to authenticate
the constitution.
In spite of certain restrictions in the L.F.O., the
policies adopted by Yahya included major concessions to
the political opposition, and the Bengali autonomists
decided once again to work through Yahya's system.
Thus, the regime maintained two mechanisms through
which It could have a decisive say in the future
constitutional order in Pakistan. First, since the
elections were expected to return a multiparty system
to the assemblies, and since the National Assembly was
given only one
-hundred and twenty days to frame the
constitution, the regime hoped to play a key role in
balancing the different parties. Secondly, even if one
paaty were to obtain an absolute majority in the National
Assembly, Yahya still retained the power to refuse
validation of the constitution.
The elections of 1970, the first general election
held in Pakistan on the basis of universal adult franchise,
worked as a catalyst to sharpen the east-west confron-
tation. Twenty-four parties participated in the I970
elections, many of which were of very small significance.
A total of eight-hundred candidates, belonging to various
parties, contested one-hundred and thirty-eight seats
(138) in the National Assembly from the four provinces in
West Pakistan, while seven-hundred and eighty-one
candidates contested (781) one-hundred and sixty-two
(162) seats from East Pakistan. Under the provisions of
the L.F.O. no member of the Yahya cabinet or ruling party
was permitted to seek election.
The parties participating included religiopolitical
rightest parties, i.e., Jama'at-i-lslami, Jamiat-ul-
Ulema-i-Pakistan
; and democratic, social-democratic, and
leftist parties such as the Pakistan Democratic Party
(PDP), the three factions--Council
,
Qayyum, and Pakistan--
of the Muslim League, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)
,
the Awami League, and the National Awami Party.
2o~ 7 ;Choudhury, op. cit .
,
p. 112.
21The
_ National Awami Party was formed as a result of a
split with it's parent body, the Awami League, over
differences of foreign policy in I956-7. It di-
vided into two factions: one group known as "pro-
Peking" and the other known as "pro-Moscow.
"
I4l
In East Pakistan the Awami League was the major
contestant. it faced opposition from both the left, i.e.,
the two factions of the National Awami Party, and the
right, i.e.. Jama
-at, PDP, and the Muslim League factions.
The Awami League’s (AL) aim was to win a commanding
majority in the National Assembly by maximizing support in
East Pakistan. The League’s major campaign theme was a
pledge to frame the constitution on the basis of the six-
points. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman emphasized his image as a
Bengali nationalist to undercut support for both the left
and right. In West Pakistan the AL’s strategy was to
depend on the regional autonomists.
Choudhry reports that : Mujib’s election campaign
strategy were simple--their sole purpose was to carry the
gospel of Bengali nationalism and the idea of Bangladesh
everywhere in Pakistan. His main theme was the exploita-
tion of Bengal by the West Pakistanis; his ideal was that
of a sonar (golden) Bengal, which was a successful
appeal to the seventy-five million poverty stricken people
of East Pakistan. The six-point program became the
rallying cry for the A.L. during the campaigns, virtually
22
Choudhury, op. cit., p.ll7. For a good discussion of
the Awami Leagues' position and the positions of the
other East Pakistan parties and leaders, see:
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serving the function of anideology during all the stages
leading to the birth of Bangladesh . ^3 Cries of jpy
Bangla (victory to Bangladesh) were heard everywhere.
In West Pakistan, no one party was in commanding
position similiar to that of the Awami League. There
was also no single issue comparable to autonomy. The
election campaign in West Pakistan was overshadowed by
the sharp polarization of the left and the right. The
major schism was between the "old guard" leadership and
youth, between the established parties and social groups
that had participated in the mass movement against Ayub.
The Pakistan People's Party, itself new and led by a
youthful leader, attracted these newly mobilized groups,
the party s slogan—Islam our faith, democracy our
polity, socialism our economy—and its plank of Roti
,
Kapra
,
aur Makan (food, cloth & shelter)
,
grew popular
and attracted most of the progressive forces to its fold.
The party s chairman, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had acquired
M. Rashiduzzaman, "The Awami League in the Political
Developement of Pakistan," Asian Survey
.
(10, No. 7),
July 1970. Also by the same author, "The National
Awami Party of Pakistan: Leftist Politics in Crisis,"
Pacific Affairs (Vancouver), XLVIII, No. 3, Fall '70.
23Kenneth E. Bauzon, "Breakdown of A Military Regime",
op. cit
.
,
p. 132.
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international stature as a foreign minister of Pakistan
under Ayub. The PPP promised Islamic socialism but the
precise nature of that socialism was not spelled out.
Bhutto’s electoral strategy was to coalesce all the anti-
regime forces, mobilize the new social groups, and voice
the demands brought to the surface during the mass
movement of 1968-69.^^
The rightest political parties which were divided
amongst themselves, also put forward their manifestos
which aimed at improving the lot of the common man, and
campaigned on the slogan "Islam in danger"
, Their
position seemed better initially in West Pakistan than in
E. Pakistan. The same was the case with parties like the
Council Muslim League and the P.D.P. The old guard's
appeal to "Islamic Ideology" and "strong central
government" were of little interest to the newly awakened
masses in West Pakistan.
The Awami League acquired an absolute hold in East
Pakistan but had no support in the West, while the
emerging West Pakistani leader Bhutto, did not dare to
set up even a single candidate in East Pakistan.
Regional polarization became increasingly evident as the
election campaign developed.
24
See Shahid J. Burki, Social Groups and Development ;
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The election results saw the Awami League and the
People's Party sweeping polls in East and West Pakistan
respectively. The Awami League won an absolute majority
in the National Assembly (160 out of 300 seats). It won
a landslide victory in East Pakistan, receiving all but
two of the one-hundred and sixty-two seats; and received
74 . 9% of the votes polled in East Pakistan. But in West
Pakistan it did not secure a single seat and the percen-
tages of votes secured by the Awami League in the four
provinces of West Pakistan were; 0.07 (Punjab)
, 0.25
(Sind), 0.22 (N.W.F.P.), and 1.0 (Baluchistan)
.
Bhutto s People s Party was the second largest party in
the National Assembly, winning eighty-one ( 81 ) out of
one-hundred and thirty-eight (I38 ) seats for West
Pakistan. Bhutto's main support came from the Punjab.
He captured (62) seats out of the (82) in the Punjab.
In Sind, his home province, he won nineteen of the twenty-
27
seven seats.
A Case Study of Pakistan for a detailed discussion of
of these groups. For a concise account of various
parties and their programs see: G.G.M. Budruddin,
Election Handbook
, Karachi, 1970.
25 .
^Rizvi, op . cit .
, p. 227 .
2 6Jahan, op. cit., p.l90.
27Singhal, op. cit .
, p. 192.
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Other political parties did not do well and some did
suprisingly poorly. For instance, the Council Muslim
League, led by Mian Mumtaz Daultana, which was expected to
emerge as the largest single party in West Pakistan, won
only seven seata. In fact the election virtually eliminated
from the scene the Muslim League, which had brought about
the founding of Pakistan. The Qayyum Muslim League won
nine seats, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam seven, Markazi
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan seven. Jama ' at-i-Islami four,
the National Awami Party (Wall Khan pro-Moscow group)
six, the Pakistan Muslim League two, the PDP one, and
independents sixteen seats.
The provincial elections
, which took place a few
days later on December 17, confirmed in all five provinces
the dominance of the two parties in their respective wings.
The Awami League won another victory (288 out of 300
seats). The People's Party won a majority in the Punjab
(113 out of 180 seats) and Sind (28 out of 60)
. In the
Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province assemblies
there was a plurality of parties, with the National Awami
28
For an analysis of the election see Craig Baxter,
"Pakistan Votes--1970 , " Asian Survey
,
(11 No. 3,
March 1971). Also for a full discussion and analysis
of the various political parties and the election
results see Mushtaq Ahmad, Politics Without Social
Change
,
chapters 3»4, and 5> Karachi: Space Publishers,
1972.
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Party ( Wall Khan group) being the dominant one.^^
The election results as far as they related to East
Pakistan, caused no suprise to the ruling elite or to any
serious observer of political development there. After
Yahya's decision to hold the elections following the
violent anti-Pakistan feelings which had arisen after the
cyclone in East Pakistan, there was not the slightest
doubt that Mu jib would monopolize all the seats there.
29 !
Baxter, op. cit
.
. p. 211.
The elections due to be held on October 5i had to bepostponed to December 1970 because of colossaldamage caused by floods occuring in East Pakistan in
^ ugust
. During the last stages of the election campaignin November 1970, the coastal region of East Pakistan
was hit by an unprecedented cyclone and tidal bore.
About 200,000 people were killed and many more rendered
homeless. The relief operations were badly handled by
the government, which at first played down the
magnitude of the disaster. This gave rise to criticism
abroad and to serious political repercussions in
East Pakistan. It helped the Awami League to focus
attention on the need for self-rule in East Pakistan.
Most observers agree that the Awami League's landslide
was made possible by the party’s exploitation of the
cyclone issue. Also the fact that Bhashani
' s National
Awami Party did not participate in the elections is
said to have given Mujib's Awami League a better
chance of gaining seats.
14?
It was the results of the election in West Pakistan which
caused greater suprise, particularly the total defeat of
the right wing and orthodox parties there and the
emergence of a non-Punjabi, Bhutto, as the leader of West
Pakistan or more precisely, of the Punjab. The People's
Party victory marked the successful assertion of the new
groups in West Pakistan politics.
Thus Bhutto emerged as the leader of West Pakistan,
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of East Pakistan. On a national
plane the Sheikh thus emerged as the prospective leader
of the government and Bhutto the leader of the opposition.
The elections crystallized the polarization between East
and West Pakistan.
After the Awami League
' s overwhelming electoral
victory, the mood in East Pakistan was one of confidence,
and there was no talk of secession. Mujib himself played
up his image as the leader of the majority party in the
National Assembly. But for Bhutto, as one observer
remarks and indeed for the West Pakistani leadership in
general, "it was psychologically difficult to accept
.
. 31Mujib's domination of the center."
31 Jahan, op. cit .
,
p. 195*
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The emergence of the Awami League and the People's
Party as clear winners upset the Yahya regime's plan
concerning post electoral alignments. The regime had
expected that the election would either brings such
parties to power as the PDF or the Islam Pasands (Islam
loving), who would not fundamentally threaten the ruling
elite s position, or that it would result in such a
plurality of parties that no party would have absolute
command, and the military would be able to consolidate
its position by working as a mediator. However it still
hoped to play the role of mediator especially so because
the two dominant parties in the two wings could not agree
on a number of points.^^
On February I3, I971, the President announced that
Pakistan's National Assembly would meet on March 3, I971
at Dacca.
Mujib's posture became more and more militant. In
his post-election speeches from January to March 1971
,
there was no trace of any compromise or any modification
of the extreme aspects of his six points. He now
declared that the six-point plan was "the property of
32See K.E. Bauzon, op. cit
.
,
p. 135 >
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the people of Bangladesh" and that there could be no
compromise on it.^^
In his post-election speeches Mujib declared:
Our people have recorded a historic verdict...
a constitution on the basis of the six-pointformula has to be framed and implemented in all
victory of the AwamiLeague is, in fact, the victory or ... Bangladesh
.
34
Then again on December 20 he repeated:
There can be no constitution except the one
which is based on the six-point program. 35
Turning to Bhutto, one found that in his post-election
speeches he was no less uncompromising and provocative.
In one speech he declared:
No constitution could be framed, nor could any
government at the center be run without my party's
cooperation. The PPP was not, prepared to occupy
the opposition benches in the National Assembly... 36Majority alone does not count in national politics.
33
^^Choudhury, op. cit .
, p. 145
.
34See Bangladesh, My Bangladesh: Selected Speeches and
Statements by Sheikh Muj'ibur Rahman, New York, 1972
pp. 20 - 21 .
^•^Ibid
.
, pp. 22 - 7 .
Pakistan Times
.
Lahore, December 22, 1970.
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Mujib's determination to maintain the six-point platform
was matched only by Bhutto's intransigence.
After failing to arrive at an agreement with Mujih,
Bhutto adopted a new strategy to bring about a political
settlement. He dicided to adopt a hard line towards the
six-point formula with the hopes that it would compel
Mu jib to come to a compromise with the P.P.P. Fearing that
his voice in the assembly would not mean anything to
Mujib and the Awami representatives, Bhutto announced on
February I 5 , 1971 that he had decided to boycott the
National Assembly session of March 3 , 1971. He demanded
postponement of the assembly and threatened to launch a
movement-'from Khyber to Karachi"^'^ if that were not done or
if any West Pakistani politician traveled to Dacca to attend
the assembly. This, as expected, precipitated a serious
crisis and made any compromise impossible. The Sheikh's
Awami League and the minor political parties in West
Pakistan were willing to meet in the assembly with or
38
without Bhutto's men.
37See Z.A. Bhutto's statement at Press Conference in
Peshawar on February I 5 , I971 as reported in Dawn,
Karachi, February I 6
, 1971.
q O
Of the eight West Pakistan parties represented in the
National Assembly, five did not respond to Bhutto's call
to boycott the Assembly. These parties together held
twenty-six seats of the one-hundred and thirty-six the
west wing held in the National Assembly.
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Succumbing to the pressure from Bhutto, who was
supported in his move by several army generals,
President Yahya announced on March 1, I 971 his fateful
decision to postpone the National Assembly session citing
Bhutto’s unwillingness to participate in the National
40Assembly. All political parties in West Pakistan
except Bhutto's party and the Qayyum Muslim League
protested the postponement of the National Assembly
session . The strongest resentment was expressed in East
Pakistan, where there arose a wave of violent protest, as
the postponement was interpreted as a conspiracy.
Under cross-pressures from the military and the
•
• 4lpolitical radicals, Mujib decided to chart a middle
course. He rejected the options of unilateral declaration
of independence or bowing down under military threat.
Instead he chose to launch a nonviolent non-cooperation
39^Bhutto was now regarded by the hawkish generals like
Hamid, Omar, and Gul Hasan, as well as by his "trusted
friend" Peerzada, as the defender of the "national
interests" of Pakistan as interpreted by the ruling
elite
.
40See Dawn
,
March 2, 1971 •
In the next few weeks Mujib was to come under pressure
both from other parties and from radicals of his own
party to declare independence. After Yahya 's announce-
ment of the postponement of the N.A. session, the pro-
Moscow faction of the National Awami Party was the
first group to call for a declaration of indepen-
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movement, giving hi™ the opportunity to oomhat the military
on his own strong ground. His strategy was to build up
such unprededented popular pressure to deter military
action and to force the regime to negotiate with him.
On March 5, Yahya issued an invitation to the
political leaders for a Round Table Conference to be held
on the 10th. He also attempted to retrieve the situation
by withdrawing his order of postponement and announced that
the assembly would meet on March 25. At the same time,
however, he warned against attempts to disrupt the unity
of the country.
While Bhutto accepted the invitation, Mujib rejected
It on the grounds that was bound to fail, following the
pattern of failure set by a similiar Round Table
Conference in I969 under Ayub. Mujib responded that he
would participate in the assembly only if the following
demands would be satisfied; (1) that Martial Law be lifted;
(2) that the soldiers be sent back to their barracks; (3)
that an investigation be made into the killings on March
dence. The pro -Peking Bhasani faction also did the
same,
_ as did other parties. Mujib at first urged a
constitutional movement, but the radicals of his party
and the student league did not want to fall behind thepopular mood. After a period of initial hesitation the
radicals of the student league supported and, in fact,
overshadowed the other groups demanding independence
.
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2, and 3rd; and (4) that power be immediately transferred to
the elected representatives of the people. To keep up
pressure on the regime he announced on March 7, 1971 that
effective on the 8th, a week long "non-violent, non-
cooperation program," or hartal (strike), would commence.
This hartal resulted in the paralyzation of government
functions in the entire eastern wing of the country. The
whole of East Pakistan administration, even Bengalis
serving in central government agencies and in the civilian
branch of the armed forces, complied with Mujib's call for
non-cooperation. The Awami League as an organization be-
came virtually the government, through the organization of
Sangram Parishad (council of action) in the sub-division
and district levels under the guidance of local AL units.
The central government's writ did not run in East Pakistan
and in fact. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman became the ^ facto
ruler of East Pakistan.
As readers will have realized, prospects of framing
a constitution on the basis of Yahya's transfer of power
plan as formulated in 1969-70 ceased to exist. The choice
before the regime was between recognizing the ^ facto
42Fazal Muqueem Khan, op. cit., p. 60-6l.
43^
K. E. Bauzon, op. cit .
,
p. 137.
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independent status of Bangladesh and challenging Mujib;
or between presiding over the dismemberment of the country.
This was the dilemma before Yahya.
Yahya agreed in principle to Mujib's four pre-
conditions; and on March 20, the combined advisers of
Yahya and the Awami League agreed on a draft proclamation
to be issued by Yahya containing the outlines of an interim
arrangement for power transfer. Fearing that he might be
placed in a losing end if he did not participate in the
talks, Bhutto flew to Dacca on March 21, and quickly
registered his objections
.
Yahya had his own difficulties during this period also.
There were some military and civil officers and other
advisers who misguided him to safeguard their own interests.
Fazal Muqueem Khan reports: " that he himself was getting
fed up with Mujibur Rahman, who it looks, now began to be
treated as an adversary. The civil as well as the military
officers who had gathered around Yahya Khan goaded him to
44 !
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Published accounts of the Yahya—Mujib talks include:
White Paper on The Crisis of East Pakistan
. (Islamabad:
Gov^t. of Pakistan Press, August 1971 ) , \^ich gives the
regime's side of the story; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The
Great Tragedy
,
(Karachi: People's Party Publication,
197lT» which gives Bhutto's version and the press reports;
Rahman Sobham, Bangladesh Documents
, pp . 277-80, (New
Delhi: Government of India, 1971), gives the Awami
League's account. Another view from the standpoint of
the PPP may be found in A.H. Karder, People '
s
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to take action. In their opinion the Awami League did not
enjoy the support of the majority of the population of East
Pakistan and the people did not have the stamina necessary
for prolonged opposition. Therefore Bengali nationalism
and their demands would cool down in a few days after
military action.
Even in this hopeless and dismal situation, Yahya
and Mujib still talked in terms of a political settlement,
while Yahya 's militant army generals were getting ready for
a confrontation and Mujib's militant supports were
similarly opposed to compromise. The fate of the country's
one -hundred and twenty million people was in the hands of
the vested interest groups--the western big business and
senior civil servants, who always dominated the political
scene in Pakistan--and two ambitious politicians.
On March 23, I 971 Mujib presented his own draft
proclamation, rejecting the one offered by Yahya which
granted full autonomy on the basis of the six-points
minus dismemberment of the country. The Awami League
Committment; Politics in Pakistan
, (Lahore: A,H. harder,
1971 ) . See also K.A. Kamal, Sheikh Mu.jibur Rahman and
the Birth of Bangladesh
,
(Dacca: Kazi Giasuddin Ahmed,
1970).
4 5
"^Fazal Muqueem Khan, op. cit .
. p. 51 .
46
The text of the new Mujib plan can be studied in the
White Paper
.
(Islamabad; 1971). Also see Golam
Choudhury, Last Days
, op. cit ., pp. 172-177.
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pressed for quick acceptance of the draft proposal and
warned that "unless it were issued within forty-eight
hours, even that would he too late."^’^ On the evening of
March 25, 1971 while the Awami Leaders still hoped to hear
the draft proclamation, Yahya suddendly left Dacca, without
formally breaking the talks, thus signalling the breakdown
"the negotiations! Almost immediately upon his departure
the military plan code-named "blitz" was activated
supposedly for the purpose of meeting "serious internal
. 48
contingencies. On that night units of the Pakistan army
attacked the Dacca University campus, the headquarters
of the East Pakistan Rifles and police, and offices of the
Awami League Newspapers. About an hour after midnight, of
the 26th, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested and the
Awami League banned. As a spontaneous reaction several
armed segments of the population, collectively known as
Mukti Bahini (liberation forces), engaged the government
soldiers in bloody clashes, thus signalling the militant
phase of the entire episode.
47 . ^See Rounaq Jahan, op. cit
.
,
p. 196.
48 See F.Z. Khan, op . cit .
,
p. 53*
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The military action destroyed the last hope of saving
the unity of Pakistan. On April I 7 , Bangladesh was
formally declared an independent and sovereign nation.
On December 3 » 1971 » India entered the war against
Pakistan. On December 6th, India formally recognized
Bangladesh. Ten days later, Dacca fell to Indian and
Mukti Bahini forces. On December 19, 1971, Yahya quit his
post and asked Bhutto to form a civilian government.
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CONCLUSION
Thus, in the post-Ayub period a number of factors
converged which accelerated the process of disintegration.
Ayub's successor Yahya at first followed a different policy
and it appeared for a time that the policy might hold the
the two wings of Pakistan together. He adopted a
conciliatory attitude toward the Bengali autonomists, and
by granting representation on the basis of population, he
increased the Bengalis stake in the union. But, he
presumed that he had the "gun" in his hand and he would
achieve the solution of the East Pakistan problem, if need
3.]ros6, by "ths us6 of bruf© forcGi
Yahya’s failure spoke also for the failure of the
whole generations of leaders that preceded him. When he
stepped into power, he found no basic institution developed
enought to persist through the crisis that was to come.
This was so because no systematic efforts were exerted by
his predecessors to create and develop them. The use of
outright coercion by the state drove the social wedge wider.
Furthermore, the rising expectation of the people and
particularly the political parties to have a share of
political power was beyond the ability of the regime to
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accomodate. This reflected the regime’s low level of
institutionalization. The constraints imposed upon the
regime emanated from internal and external sources. The
organizational weakness, along with the questionable
competence of the men in authority, were the main internal
factors. The external ones were created by the limited
capacity of the dominant political forces to accomadate
each others demands.
Bhutto's inordinate ambition was to acquire power at
any cost. Having realized that Mu jib would not agree to
any amendment to his six-point formula, Bhutto adopted a
hard line to cow him down. His boycott of the National
Assembly in March I971 created an explosive situation and
a point of no return. Mujibur Rahman was not in favor of
immediate declaration of independence and wanted to delay
it for some time. He was not sincere or straight-forward
in his political negotiations in I969— 70} he pledged to
modify his six-points and to maintain the unity of Pakistan.
What happened in East Pakistan was tragic but not
suprising. It was the outcome of the failure of the political
leaders and the generals to arrive at a political settle-
ment; the Soviet support of India, and the Indian
l6o
invasion of East Pakistan. Basically it represented the
failure of Yahya Khan, z.A. Bhutto and Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman
.
The experience of Pakistan, suggest that it might be
easy for a disciplined army to take over the reigns of
government in a developing country which is facing the
crisis of modernization and suffers from horizontal and
vertical cleavages but the military cannot solve all the
problems facing the new nations. It may check political
instability, introduce certain social and economic reforms
and accelerate the rate of economic growth but it cannot
tacke the real problem which leads to a coup d'etat--
creation of a viable framework of political action which
can function smoothly without the backing of military
commanders
.
Once the military enters politics it becomes difficult
for them to dissociate from politics and revert to their
previous apolitical position. The military commanders
watch politics closely even after the restoration of
constitutional life. If the new political system does not
resolve the problem of political change and succession in
161
an^ orderly way or the government is paralyzed by the
agitatxon of the discontented elements, they again step
into the political field, (witness the re-emergence of
the military in the politics of Pakistan, whereupon a
mass movement protesting a +•ooxii rigged election returned
Pakistan to military rule in July 1977).
It seems plausible to suggest, therefore, that the
extent of the military's role in -nnii + - ^y s politics depends on the
performance of the civil government in solving the
multifarious political, social, and economic problems and
the degree of public attachment to the civilian institutions.
There is an urgent need to set up stable civilian
institutions which can create a sense of participation amongst
the people of all classes and provinces. Simmering dis-
content and growing lawlessness weakens the civilian base.
The military intervened in the politics of Pakistan because
the civil leadership was impotent and the public attach-
ment to the civilian institutions was fragile. Unless
necessary methods are devised to remove the causes of
discontent and a balence is kept between diverse social,
political, and economic forces working in the political
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system of Pakistan, chances of the military assuming
political role will continue to be considerable.
In addition, the frequent use of the military for the
police function should be discouraged, it is suggested
that intervention in politics ruins the military as an
organization for defense. It becomes corrupt, soft, and
incompetent
.
The political malaise which marred the prospects of
democracy in Pakistan during 194?-58 has not been rectified.
Besides a dominant political party, there are numerous
opposition parties which are regional in composition and
parochial in outlook. If elections are held regularly and
a sense of participation is created amongst the people of
the smaller provinces the tendencies of regionalism and
parochial outlook can be arrested. The government must
solve the problems of the people or at least convince them
that it is working for their betternment.
Thus, from our analysis one may reasonably conjecture,
that in safeguarding against military intervention in
politics, a major responsibility falls on the shoulders
of the political leadership. Their inability to establish
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and run the civilian institutions and failure to keep a
balance between diverse forces working in the political
system, generates political ambitions in the minds of the
generals. If the civilian institutions are not capable of
asserting themselves on the military, the military by virtue
of their qualities will dominate the civil institutions.
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